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First, the government and FARC-EP agreed that the goal of the negotiation was simply to put 
an end to armed conict, rather than to “make peace” in any positive sense. is may sound 
obvious, but it is essential to manage internal and external expectations of what a process can 
achieve. In past attempts, Colombia governments “sold” peace talks to the public as a 
panacea, promising that the peace agreement would instantly bring about development and 
other benets besides the silencing of guns. is proved to be a mistake insofar as adversarial 
parties could simply not deliver on this process, damaging the government’s popularity and 
credibility and defrauding the public’s expectations. By contrast, the government’s simple 
agreement with FARC-EP to limit the desired outcome proved a powerful focal point, such 
that from the outset the political will existed to seek common ground. e framework sets an 
agenda with the clear objective of ending political violence in order to give way to a 
peace-building phase, namely where the agreements will be implemented with the 
participation of the whole population on their own territories. e framework agenda, agreed 
in the secret phase of the talks, was designed to include only the topics necessary to guarantee 
an end to armed conict and to lay the basis for a separate peace-building phase. e six 
topics mentioned above were chosen because both sides agreed that putting these reforms and 
mechanisms in place would end political violence and allow peace to ourish in Colombia. 
e parties agreed not only on the desired outcome, but also on a shared vision of the 
sequencing of the process: 
• Phase One – the exploratory secret talks, which lasted around six months; 
• Phase Two – the public talks, which were announced at a public event in Oslo, Norway in 
October 2012; and 
• Phase ree – the beginning of the “transition” and the local implementation of the 
agreements (also known as the territorial peace-building stage). 
e second feature of the talks was that, against all odds, the government and FARC-EP’s 
agreed agenda was clear and concise: it comprised just six topics (viz. ve substantive topics 
and one procedural point on implementation, verication and endorsement). is evidenced 
the will of the parties to reach a concrete outcome in a relevant time-frame by engaging a 
nite number of issues. Limiting the agenda proved absolutely essential to organising the 
process in Havana. e xed agenda has been valuable above all for separating the 
often-technical talks from the more political deliberations taking place within the 
appropriate institutions of Colombian democracy. Of course all six issues are tightly related 
to matters o the negotiating table (e.g., agrarian policy, the transitional justice mechanisms 
for national military forces, the policy on the war on drugs), but the wording of the agenda 
has been the criteria separating the conversations taking place in Cuba and in Colombia.  
e third key feature of the peace process design is the operational rulebook included in the 
framework agenda. is regulates issues of condentiality; the interaction of the parties with 
the media during negotiations; the talks’ outreach strategy; the authorised number of 
delegates of each party; the creation of participation mechanisms for civil society; and many 
other procedural issues that, if not regulated, could easily derail or obstruct the negotiations. 
For example, Rule VI states, “A mechanism for jointly communicating progress made by the 
Table shall be set up. Discussions held at the Table shall not be made public and an ecient 
communications strategy shall be implemented”. 
e design and preparation of the Colombian peace process is setting a new standard for 
future peace talks around the world. e Colombian case has shown that a well thought-out 
process can prove an advantage for both parties. It gives hope that most crises are solvable on 
the basis of the rules and mechanisms established in a framework agenda, as these initial 
agreements give the whole subsequent negotiation stability by providing a common ground 
and a sense of predictability and common purpose.
VICTIM’S RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PARTICIPATION.
Victim’s rights and the question of how to deal with the legacy of the past have been neglected 
or poorly managed in many peace processes around the world, because of their complexity 
and sensitivity. Disputes over how to deal with the grievances of warring parties often prove 
to be a deal-breaker. Many negotiations have chosen to leave the issue of victim’s rights to 
future political debate, to avoid “contaminating” the process with “insoluble” issues that 
might derail it. is stems from a specious contradiction between justice and peace. Past trials 
at peace-making have given priority to reaching the peace agreement, regardless of justice, 
truth or reparations. Experience has exposed this approach as fundamentally awed, because 
postponing the demands of justice to future generations, and leaving unattended the seeds of 
potential conict, achieves only an unstable and short-lived peace. 
e Colombian peace process dees this approach. Both parties have agreed from the start 
that victims’ rights must be a distinct and central issue on the agenda. is acknowledgement 
responds to the sheer magnitude of human suering in the country: there are seven million 
victims of the various warring parties so far, 80% of whom are civilians. e government and 
FARC-EP recognised that an agreement that did not place victims’ rights at its core would be 
not only be unlawful, but also immoral, illegitimate and ephemeral. International law as it 
stands today provides for justice, truth and reparations to the victims of internationally 
recognised crimes. In acknowledgement of the value of the Colombian case, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is looking closely at it to understand how international criminal law 
Another key innovation of the Colombian peace process regarding international involvement 
is the participation role of international advisors. Both sides of the table have access to teams 
of international experts who can advise them on various matters, as provided by the 
framework agreement. is resource mechanism has been available in discussions on political 
participation and transitional justice, where international experience has proved invaluable. 
International input has played a positive role in bringing lessons and experiences learned 
from other peace processes around the world to bear on Colombia’s situation, and oering 
the parties a variety of solutions and ideas to the tactical and strategic dilemmas of the talks.
Another important feature of the peace process is the role played by the guarantor countries, 
Norway and Cuba, and by the observer countries, Chile and Venezuela. e guarantors’ role 
is to ensure that both parties abide by the agreed-upon rules, as trust can wane as negotiations 
wear on (Beittel 2013: 27). ere are also observers whose role is to clarify the disputed 
points in the case of a crisis that may lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations 
(Armengol 2013, 6). However, there is no appointed international mediator in the 
Colombian process (Gienger 2013). e role of these four countries has been key in settling 
disputes during negotiations; building trust between the parties; and solving the many 
day-to-day logistical issues.
Arranging a positive and supportive international context has been indispensable to the peace 
process because it helped shore up external legitimacy; gave much-needed access to lessons 
learnt in other countries; and served as an important indicator of progress for an 
often-incredulous public opinion at home. Negotiation of the topics in the framework 
agreement, especially those of illicit drugs and transitional justice, will have important 
international ramications. e international ambience set up before and kept in place during 
the process will certainly conduce to dealing with them in a constructive and positive way.  
PREPARATION, STRUCTURE AND DESIGN.
e Colombian peace talks are an example of preparing and designing a negotiation 
adequately to reach the desired endgame. During the exploratory talks, or what is commonly 
known in the literature as “talks about talks”, the parties agreed on three features that have 
proved crucial for the development of the public phase of the process. 
During conict, irregular armies, mainly FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas, waged war on the 
State and paramilitary forces throughout most of the country. e Colombian situation is 
one of the longest-running internal armed conicts in the world. As the following gures 
suggest, this devastating confrontation has been active for over ve decades and its magnitude 
was, and still is greater than many major inter-state wars in the world.
• As at the end of 2014, 38 million people around the world had been forced to ee their 
homes by armed conict. Colombia ranks second in the world according to the number of 
internally displaced people (IDP), with around 6 million IDPs, only surpassed by Syria with 
7.6 million. Iraq holds third place with 3.3 million. e IDP population of Colombia is 
equivalent to the whole population of Singapore or Denmark (IDMC, 2015).
• e Colombian government’s reparations programme set up in 2011 has so far registered 
7.7 million victims of displacement, murder, torture, sexual violence, disappearance and 
kidnapping, and other grave violations of human rights. is tally implies that almost 14% 
of the total population has suered directly from the conict and consider themselves victims 
(Colombia, Unidad de Victimas, 2015).
• Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of landmine victims; only Afghanistan and 
Cambodia have more victims of landmines (Colombia, PAICMA, 2015). 
• 220,000 killings have been registered during the conict, 80% of them civilians (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). is includes three Presidential candidates, one 
Attorney General, one Minister of Justice, 200 judges, 175 Mayors and sixteen Congressmen 
who were assassinated during the conict.
• Colombia has registered 100,000 victims of involuntary ‘disappearance’, a sum equal to all 
reported cases under the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile and Brazil combined (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). 
• 3,000 militants of a single political party, the Unión Patriótica, were killed in a period of ten 
years during the internal war (Dudley, 2006).  
• e authorities have registered 39,058 kidnappings in the period between 1970 and 2010. 
is implies that, during that period, one person was abducted every 12 hours for political or 
economic ends (Colombia, Centro de Memoria Historica, Informe Secuestro 2013). 
• Governmental authorities and non-governmental organisations together have registered 
about 5,000 extrajudicial killings carried out by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.
An important feature of the Colombian peace process is that it has been exclusively led by the 
national government (Haspeslagh, 2015); while at the same time interactively engaging third 
parties and the international community as a whole. e role played by diplomacy partially 
explains why the peace eort is moving forward and achieving success; the international 
community as a whole and many leading states, which have become part of the process, have 
been a key to progress. 
From the beginning of his term in 2010, President Santos recognised that Colombia had to 
reboot its foreign policy and rebuild diplomatic ties with the world at large and with the 
Latin American region, especially its close neighbours Venezuela and Ecuador. e 
government of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) had escalated confrontations with other states in 
the region, accusing them of harbouring and supporting “terrorists”. At the global level, the 
international community had mistrusted the Colombian government because of its poor 
record on human rights, corruption, and for some, for its alignment with the Bush 
Administration during the rst years of the “war on terror”.  In early 2010 the international 
context was not appropriate to start negotiations to end one of the longest conicts of the 
Western Hemisphere, one heavily inuenced by the international drug trade, and one in 
which FARC-EP, the Colombian military forces, and various the paramilitaries were all 
involved in war international crimes. 
President Juan Manuel Santos and his Ministers knew that if a peace agreement were reached, 
the outcome would impact many foreign political agendas, such as US relations with Cuba 
and Venezuela, the limits of international criminal law, and the global debate over the war on 
drugs, among others. is is why Santos has been active and very successful in changing the 
negative trend inherited from the past. All nations in South America now fully support the 
Colombian peace process, and many countries around the world are ready to contribute to 
the implementation and verication of the nal agreements on matters ranging from 
investment in rural infrastructure, to reintegration of ex-combatants, to victims’ rights. 
Diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador were rebuilt and trust restored to the point 
that Venezuela could be accepted as a sponsor of the peace talks. Colombian diplomacy was 
strategic enough to enlist and appoint Cuba as the host country and guarantor of the process, 
alongside Norway, while keeping the US on board. So far, the USA, UNASUR, the European 
Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations have appointed special envoys to the 
process, which suggests a growing interest in the outcome and a commitment to addressing 
the challenges thereof. For example, when US Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Bernie 
Aronson the US Special Envoy, he stated: 
After a long year of negotiations on the topic of victims’ rights and transitional justice, the 
parties agreed three key elements of a broader transitional justice regime. In June 2015 they 
agreed the creation of a Truth Commission. On the 23rd of September 2015 the President of 
Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, and the FARC-EP’s Timochenko announced an agreement 
to create a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a mechanism to investigate, prosecute and punish 
international crimes. Finally, on the 18th of October 2015, the delegations announced an 
agreement to create a specialised unit (in addition to the CBM mentioned above) to search 
for people who disappeared as a result of the conict, which will start operations after the 
peace agreement, is signed.
Victims’ participation has been essential to the delegations’ work and to the peace process as 
a whole. e views expressed by victims are currently informing many agreements on the 
topic. Putting victims’ rights at the centre of the peace process has been one of the main 
contributions of the Colombian peace process.
CONCLUSION.
According to many experts, Colombia is currently the main peace process in the world and a 
cynosure of international peace-building. e Colombian case is proof that protracted 
internal armed conict can be addressed through dialogue (Herbolzheimer, 2014). I have 
discussed three main contributions that have emerging from the Colombian process: (i) a role 
for active diplomacy to enable a respectful international engagement, while at the same time 
conserving national ownership of the process; (ii) a robust strategic plan that observes the 
dierence between negotiating the end of the conict and building peace, between peace 
talks and the peace process; (iii) the commitment to victims’ rights, which has led to a 
national and global debate over the possibilities and limits of applying international criminal 
law in the context of peace negotiations, and the meaning of reconciliation. Colombia is a 
timely reference for a global community standing at the crossroads of ways to address 
complex violence in the age of accountability. 
e treatment given to diplomacy, the importance of contextual preparation and design, and 
the inclusion of victims’ rights as a central issue all evidence that Colombia’s peace process is 
setting new standards in many elds and is becoming an exemplar for peace endeavours 
around the world. Colombia is developing a new model that other countries, especially in the 
Global South, can adopt to satisfy the increasing global demands for accountability, while 
also helping those in conict to achieve a stable and lasting peace.
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might be harmonised with the right of states to pursue peace for their peoples and future 
generations. Currently, both parties are aiming for a peace deal that looks to the future but 
also recognises and acknowledges what happened in the past. ere is a common 
understanding that in order to initiate the peace-building phase, not only the parties to the 
conict but also the whole population must face the past in a constructive, reective and 
comprehensive way. 
To carry out the principle of prioritising victim’s rights, the parties have created three 
mechanisms to empower victims to take their rightful place in the talks. e Colombian 
peace process is a world-class example of how victims can participate directly in peace talks. 
In past peace processes around the world, victims and their organisations only had a chance 
to be involved after an agreement was reached, either participating in truth commissions or 
in trials against perpetrators. In the Colombian process, victims have been actively 
participating from the outset. 
e rst mechanism created was a direct channel, via electronic or conventional mail, for 
sending proposals to both delegations, so that victims could directly contribute to the drafting 
of the agreements. To date, the government and FARC-EP have received 24,475 proposals 
regarding victims’ rights issues (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e second mechanism was participation in several events in Colombia expressly created for 
victims to impact the negotiations in Cuba. e delegations appointed a collegiate third 
party, composed of the United Nations, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and the 
Catholic Church, to organise regional events where victims from all over the country could 
deliver their views, expectations and proposals. ese events where attended by 3,162 victims 
and 4,617 victims’ organisations, from whom the parties received an additional 22,146 
proposals (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e third mechanism consisted of public hearings in Havana, where victims were invited to 
engage directly with both delegations. e sessions took place before and during the 
discussion of victims’ rights and transitional justice with the aim of hearing victims in person 
tell of their expectations and demands, in hopes that this would enlighten the talks while they 
were still on going. In ve hearings, sixty victims from dierent regions, who had suered 
diverse violations of their rights at the hands of many armed actors, were able to confront the 
delegations and by their narratives convey their suering, expectations and needs. is 
unprecedented mechanism was pivotal for starting the dicult negotiations about how to 
deal with the past in Colombia.
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Colombia has suered one of the longest internal armed conicts in the world. is long and 
tainted war has been active for over ve decades and its magnitude was, and still is greater 
than many major internal conicts around the world. During the last four years the 
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First, the government and FARC-EP agreed that the goal of the negotiation was simply to put 
an end to armed conict, rather than to “make peace” in any positive sense. is may sound 
obvious, but it is essential to manage internal and external expectations of what a process can 
achieve. In past attempts, Colombia governments “sold” peace talks to the public as a 
panacea, promising that the peace agreement would instantly bring about development and 
other benets besides the silencing of guns. is proved to be a mistake insofar as adversarial 
parties could simply not deliver on this process, damaging the government’s popularity and 
credibility and defrauding the public’s expectations. By contrast, the government’s simple 
agreement with FARC-EP to limit the desired outcome proved a powerful focal point, such 
that from the outset the political will existed to seek common ground. e framework sets an 
agenda with the clear objective of ending political violence in order to give way to a 
peace-building phase, namely where the agreements will be implemented with the 
participation of the whole population on their own territories. e framework agenda, agreed 
in the secret phase of the talks, was designed to include only the topics necessary to guarantee 
an end to armed conict and to lay the basis for a separate peace-building phase. e six 
topics mentioned above were chosen because both sides agreed that putting these reforms and 
mechanisms in place would end political violence and allow peace to ourish in Colombia. 
e parties agreed not only on the desired outcome, but also on a shared vision of the 
sequencing of the process: 
• Phase One – the exploratory secret talks, which lasted around six months; 
• Phase Two – the public talks, which were announced at a public event in Oslo, Norway in 
October 2012; and 
• Phase ree – the beginning of the “transition” and the local implementation of the 
agreements (also known as the territorial peace-building stage). 
e second feature of the talks was that, against all odds, the government and FARC-EP’s 
agreed agenda was clear and concise: it comprised just six topics (viz. ve substantive topics 
and one procedural point on implementation, verication and endorsement). is evidenced 
the will of the parties to reach a concrete outcome in a relevant time-frame by engaging a 
nite number of issues. Limiting the agenda proved absolutely essential to organising the 
process in Havana. e xed agenda has been valuable above all for separating the 
often-technical talks from the more political deliberations taking place within the 
appropriate institutions of Colombian democracy. Of course all six issues are tightly related 
to matters o the negotiating table (e.g., agrarian policy, the transitional justice mechanisms 
for national military forces, the policy on the war on drugs), but the wording of the agenda 
has been the criteria separating the conversations taking place in Cuba and in Colombia.  
e third key feature of the peace process design is the operational rulebook included in the 
framework agenda. is regulates issues of condentiality; the interaction of the parties with 
the media during negotiations; the talks’ outreach strategy; the authorised number of 
delegates of each party; the creation of participation mechanisms for civil society; and many 
other procedural issues that, if not regulated, could easily derail or obstruct the negotiations. 
For example, Rule VI states, “A mechanism for jointly communicating progress made by the 
Table shall be set up. Discussions held at the Table shall not be made public and an ecient 
communications strategy shall be implemented”. 
e design and preparation of the Colombian peace process is setting a new standard for 
future peace talks around the world. e Colombian case has shown that a well thought-out 
process can prove an advantage for both parties. It gives hope that most crises are solvable on 
the basis of the rules and mechanisms established in a framework agenda, as these initial 
agreements give the whole subsequent negotiation stability by providing a common ground 
and a sense of predictability and common purpose.
VICTIM’S RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PARTICIPATION.
Victim’s rights and the question of how to deal with the legacy of the past have been neglected 
or poorly managed in many peace processes around the world, because of their complexity 
and sensitivity. Disputes over how to deal with the grievances of warring parties often prove 
to be a deal-breaker. Many negotiations have chosen to leave the issue of victim’s rights to 
future political debate, to avoid “contaminating” the process with “insoluble” issues that 
might derail it. is stems from a specious contradiction between justice and peace. Past trials 
at peace-making have given priority to reaching the peace agreement, regardless of justice, 
truth or reparations. Experience has exposed this approach as fundamentally awed, because 
postponing the demands of justice to future generations, and leaving unattended the seeds of 
potential conict, achieves only an unstable and short-lived peace. 
e Colombian peace process dees this approach. Both parties have agreed from the start 
that victims’ rights must be a distinct and central issue on the agenda. is acknowledgement 
responds to the sheer magnitude of human suering in the country: there are seven million 
victims of the various warring parties so far, 80% of whom are civilians. e government and 
FARC-EP recognised that an agreement that did not place victims’ rights at its core would be 
not only be unlawful, but also immoral, illegitimate and ephemeral. International law as it 
stands today provides for justice, truth and reparations to the victims of internationally 
recognised crimes. In acknowledgement of the value of the Colombian case, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is looking closely at it to understand how international criminal law 
Another key innovation of the Colombian peace process regarding international involvement 
is the participation role of international advisors. Both sides of the table have access to teams 
of international experts who can advise them on various matters, as provided by the 
framework agreement. is resource mechanism has been available in discussions on political 
participation and transitional justice, where international experience has proved invaluable. 
International input has played a positive role in bringing lessons and experiences learned 
from other peace processes around the world to bear on Colombia’s situation, and oering 
the parties a variety of solutions and ideas to the tactical and strategic dilemmas of the talks.
Another important feature of the peace process is the role played by the guarantor countries, 
Norway and Cuba, and by the observer countries, Chile and Venezuela. e guarantors’ role 
is to ensure that both parties abide by the agreed-upon rules, as trust can wane as negotiations 
wear on (Beittel 2013: 27). ere are also observers whose role is to clarify the disputed 
points in the case of a crisis that may lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations 
(Armengol 2013, 6). However, there is no appointed international mediator in the 
Colombian process (Gienger 2013). e role of these four countries has been key in settling 
disputes during negotiations; building trust between the parties; and solving the many 
day-to-day logistical issues.
Arranging a positive and supportive international context has been indispensable to the peace 
process because it helped shore up external legitimacy; gave much-needed access to lessons 
learnt in other countries; and served as an important indicator of progress for an 
often-incredulous public opinion at home. Negotiation of the topics in the framework 
agreement, especially those of illicit drugs and transitional justice, will have important 
international ramications. e international ambience set up before and kept in place during 
the process will certainly conduce to dealing with them in a constructive and positive way.  
PREPARATION, STRUCTURE AND DESIGN.
e Colombian peace talks are an example of preparing and designing a negotiation 
adequately to reach the desired endgame. During the exploratory talks, or what is commonly 
known in the literature as “talks about talks”, the parties agreed on three features that have 
proved crucial for the development of the public phase of the process. 
During conict, irregular armies, mainly FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas, waged war on the 
State and paramilitary forces throughout most of the country. e Colombian situation is 
one of the longest-running internal armed conicts in the world. As the following gures 
suggest, this devastating confrontation has been active for over ve decades and its magnitude 
was, and still is greater than many major inter-state wars in the world.
• As at the end of 2014, 38 million people around the world had been forced to ee their 
homes by armed conict. Colombia ranks second in the world according to the number of 
internally displaced people (IDP), with around 6 million IDPs, only surpassed by Syria with 
7.6 million. Iraq holds third place with 3.3 million. e IDP population of Colombia is 
equivalent to the whole population of Singapore or Denmark (IDMC, 2015).
• e Colombian government’s reparations programme set up in 2011 has so far registered 
7.7 million victims of displacement, murder, torture, sexual violence, disappearance and 
kidnapping, and other grave violations of human rights. is tally implies that almost 14% 
of the total population has suered directly from the conict and consider themselves victims 
(Colombia, Unidad de Victimas, 2015).
• Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of landmine victims; only Afghanistan and 
Cambodia have more victims of landmines (Colombia, PAICMA, 2015). 
• 220,000 killings have been registered during the conict, 80% of them civilians (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). is includes three Presidential candidates, one 
Attorney General, one Minister of Justice, 200 judges, 175 Mayors and sixteen Congressmen 
who were assassinated during the conict.
• Colombia has registered 100,000 victims of involuntary ‘disappearance’, a sum equal to all 
reported cases under the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile and Brazil combined (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). 
• 3,000 militants of a single political party, the Unión Patriótica, were killed in a period of ten 
years during the internal war (Dudley, 2006).  
• e authorities have registered 39,058 kidnappings in the period between 1970 and 2010. 
is implies that, during that period, one person was abducted every 12 hours for political or 
economic ends (Colombia, Centro de Memoria Historica, Informe Secuestro 2013). 
• Governmental authorities and non-governmental organisations together have registered 
about 5,000 extrajudicial killings carried out by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.
An important feature of the Colombian peace process is that it has been exclusively led by the 
national government (Haspeslagh, 2015); while at the same time interactively engaging third 
parties and the international community as a whole. e role played by diplomacy partially 
explains why the peace eort is moving forward and achieving success; the international 
community as a whole and many leading states, which have become part of the process, have 
been a key to progress. 
From the beginning of his term in 2010, President Santos recognised that Colombia had to 
reboot its foreign policy and rebuild diplomatic ties with the world at large and with the 
Latin American region, especially its close neighbours Venezuela and Ecuador. e 
government of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) had escalated confrontations with other states in 
the region, accusing them of harbouring and supporting “terrorists”. At the global level, the 
international community had mistrusted the Colombian government because of its poor 
record on human rights, corruption, and for some, for its alignment with the Bush 
Administration during the rst years of the “war on terror”.  In early 2010 the international 
context was not appropriate to start negotiations to end one of the longest conicts of the 
Western Hemisphere, one heavily inuenced by the international drug trade, and one in 
which FARC-EP, the Colombian military forces, and various the paramilitaries were all 
involved in war international crimes. 
President Juan Manuel Santos and his Ministers knew that if a peace agreement were reached, 
the outcome would impact many foreign political agendas, such as US relations with Cuba 
and Venezuela, the limits of international criminal law, and the global debate over the war on 
drugs, among others. is is why Santos has been active and very successful in changing the 
negative trend inherited from the past. All nations in South America now fully support the 
Colombian peace process, and many countries around the world are ready to contribute to 
the implementation and verication of the nal agreements on matters ranging from 
investment in rural infrastructure, to reintegration of ex-combatants, to victims’ rights. 
Diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador were rebuilt and trust restored to the point 
that Venezuela could be accepted as a sponsor of the peace talks. Colombian diplomacy was 
strategic enough to enlist and appoint Cuba as the host country and guarantor of the process, 
alongside Norway, while keeping the US on board. So far, the USA, UNASUR, the European 
Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations have appointed special envoys to the 
process, which suggests a growing interest in the outcome and a commitment to addressing 
the challenges thereof. For example, when US Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Bernie 
Aronson the US Special Envoy, he stated: 
After a long year of negotiations on the topic of victims’ rights and transitional justice, the 
parties agreed three key elements of a broader transitional justice regime. In June 2015 they 
agreed the creation of a Truth Commission. On the 23rd of September 2015 the President of 
Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, and the FARC-EP’s Timochenko announced an agreement 
to create a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a mechanism to investigate, prosecute and punish 
international crimes. Finally, on the 18th of October 2015, the delegations announced an 
agreement to create a specialised unit (in addition to the CBM mentioned above) to search 
for people who disappeared as a result of the conict, which will start operations after the 
peace agreement, is signed.
Victims’ participation has been essential to the delegations’ work and to the peace process as 
a whole. e views expressed by victims are currently informing many agreements on the 
topic. Putting victims’ rights at the centre of the peace process has been one of the main 
contributions of the Colombian peace process.
CONCLUSION.
According to many experts, Colombia is currently the main peace process in the world and a 
cynosure of international peace-building. e Colombian case is proof that protracted 
internal armed conict can be addressed through dialogue (Herbolzheimer, 2014). I have 
discussed three main contributions that have emerging from the Colombian process: (i) a role 
for active diplomacy to enable a respectful international engagement, while at the same time 
conserving national ownership of the process; (ii) a robust strategic plan that observes the 
dierence between negotiating the end of the conict and building peace, between peace 
talks and the peace process; (iii) the commitment to victims’ rights, which has led to a 
national and global debate over the possibilities and limits of applying international criminal 
law in the context of peace negotiations, and the meaning of reconciliation. Colombia is a 
timely reference for a global community standing at the crossroads of ways to address 
complex violence in the age of accountability. 
e treatment given to diplomacy, the importance of contextual preparation and design, and 
the inclusion of victims’ rights as a central issue all evidence that Colombia’s peace process is 
setting new standards in many elds and is becoming an exemplar for peace endeavours 
around the world. Colombia is developing a new model that other countries, especially in the 
Global South, can adopt to satisfy the increasing global demands for accountability, while 
also helping those in conict to achieve a stable and lasting peace.
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might be harmonised with the right of states to pursue peace for their peoples and future 
generations. Currently, both parties are aiming for a peace deal that looks to the future but 
also recognises and acknowledges what happened in the past. ere is a common 
understanding that in order to initiate the peace-building phase, not only the parties to the 
conict but also the whole population must face the past in a constructive, reective and 
comprehensive way. 
To carry out the principle of prioritising victim’s rights, the parties have created three 
mechanisms to empower victims to take their rightful place in the talks. e Colombian 
peace process is a world-class example of how victims can participate directly in peace talks. 
In past peace processes around the world, victims and their organisations only had a chance 
to be involved after an agreement was reached, either participating in truth commissions or 
in trials against perpetrators. In the Colombian process, victims have been actively 
participating from the outset. 
e rst mechanism created was a direct channel, via electronic or conventional mail, for 
sending proposals to both delegations, so that victims could directly contribute to the drafting 
of the agreements. To date, the government and FARC-EP have received 24,475 proposals 
regarding victims’ rights issues (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e second mechanism was participation in several events in Colombia expressly created for 
victims to impact the negotiations in Cuba. e delegations appointed a collegiate third 
party, composed of the United Nations, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and the 
Catholic Church, to organise regional events where victims from all over the country could 
deliver their views, expectations and proposals. ese events where attended by 3,162 victims 
and 4,617 victims’ organisations, from whom the parties received an additional 22,146 
proposals (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e third mechanism consisted of public hearings in Havana, where victims were invited to 
engage directly with both delegations. e sessions took place before and during the 
discussion of victims’ rights and transitional justice with the aim of hearing victims in person 
tell of their expectations and demands, in hopes that this would enlighten the talks while they 
were still on going. In ve hearings, sixty victims from dierent regions, who had suered 
diverse violations of their rights at the hands of many armed actors, were able to confront the 
delegations and by their narratives convey their suering, expectations and needs. is 
unprecedented mechanism was pivotal for starting the dicult negotiations about how to 
deal with the past in Colombia.
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First, the government and FARC-EP agreed that the goal of the negotiation was simply to put 
an end to armed conict, rather than to “make peace” in any positive sense. is may sound 
obvious, but it is essential to manage internal and external expectations of what a process can 
achieve. In past attempts, Colombia governments “sold” peace talks to the public as a 
panacea, promising that the peace agreement would instantly bring about development and 
other benets besides the silencing of guns. is proved to be a mistake insofar as adversarial 
parties could simply not deliver on this process, damaging the government’s popularity and 
credibility and defrauding the public’s expectations. By contrast, the government’s simple 
agreement with FARC-EP to limit the desired outcome proved a powerful focal point, such 
that from the outset the political will existed to seek common ground. e framework sets an 
agenda with the clear objective of ending political violence in order to give way to a 
peace-building phase, namely where the agreements will be implemented with the 
participation of the whole population on their own territories. e framework agenda, agreed 
in the secret phase of the talks, was designed to include only the topics necessary to guarantee 
an end to armed conict and to lay the basis for a separate peace-building phase. e six 
topics mentioned above were chosen because both sides agreed that putting these reforms and 
mechanisms in place would end political violence and allow peace to ourish in Colombia. 
e parties agreed not only on the desired outcome, but also on a shared vision of the 
sequencing of the process: 
• Phase One – the exploratory secret talks, which lasted around six months; 
• Phase Two – the public talks, which were announced at a public event in Oslo, Norway in 
October 2012; and 
• Phase ree – the beginning of the “transition” and the local implementation of the 
agreements (also known as the territorial peace-building stage). 
e second feature of the talks was that, against all odds, the government and FARC-EP’s 
agreed agenda was clear and concise: it comprised just six topics (viz. ve substantive topics 
and one procedural point on implementation, verication and endorsement). is evidenced 
the will of the parties to reach a concrete outcome in a relevant time-frame by engaging a 
nite number of issues. Limiting the agenda proved absolutely essential to organising the 
process in Havana. e xed agenda has been valuable above all for separating the 
often-technical talks from the more political deliberations taking place within the 
appropriate institutions of Colombian democracy. Of course all six issues are tightly related 
to matters o the negotiating table (e.g., agrarian policy, the transitional justice mechanisms 
for national military forces, the policy on the war on drugs), but the wording of the agenda 
has been the criteria separating the conversations taking place in Cuba and in Colombia.  
e third key feature of the peace process design is the operational rulebook included in the 
framework agenda. is regulates issues of condentiality; the interaction of the parties with 
the media during negotiations; the talks’ outreach strategy; the authorised number of 
delegates of each party; the creation of participation mechanisms for civil society; and many 
other procedural issues that, if not regulated, could easily derail or obstruct the negotiations. 
For example, Rule VI states, “A mechanism for jointly communicating progress made by the 
Table shall be set up. Discussions held at the Table shall not be made public and an ecient 
communications strategy shall be implemented”. 
e design and preparation of the Colombian peace process is setting a new standard for 
future peace talks around the world. e Colombian case has shown that a well thought-out 
process can prove an advantage for both parties. It gives hope that most crises are solvable on 
the basis of the rules and mechanisms established in a framework agenda, as these initial 
agreements give the whole subsequent negotiation stability by providing a common ground 
and a sense of predictability and common purpose.
VICTIM’S RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PARTICIPATION.
Victim’s rights and the question of how to deal with the legacy of the past have been neglected 
or poorly managed in many peace processes around the world, because of their complexity 
and sensitivity. Disputes over how to deal with the grievances of warring parties often prove 
to be a deal-breaker. Many negotiations have chosen to leave the issue of victim’s rights to 
future political debate, to avoid “contaminating” the process with “insoluble” issues that 
might derail it. is stems from a specious contradiction between justice and peace. Past trials 
at peace-making have given priority to reaching the peace agreement, regardless of justice, 
truth or reparations. Experience has exposed this approach as fundamentally awed, because 
postponing the demands of justice to future generations, and leaving unattended the seeds of 
potential conict, achieves only an unstable and short-lived peace. 
e Colombian peace process dees this approach. Both parties have agreed from the start 
that victims’ rights must be a distinct and central issue on the agenda. is acknowledgement 
responds to the sheer magnitude of human suering in the country: there are seven million 
victims of the various warring parties so far, 80% of whom are civilians. e government and 
FARC-EP recognised that an agreement that did not place victims’ rights at its core would be 
not only be unlawful, but also immoral, illegitimate and ephemeral. International law as it 
stands today provides for justice, truth and reparations to the victims of internationally 
recognised crimes. In acknowledgement of the value of the Colombian case, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is looking closely at it to understand how international criminal law 
Another key innovation of the Colombian peace process regarding international involvement 
is the participation role of international advisors. Both sides of the table have access to teams 
of international experts who can advise them on various matters, as provided by the 
framework agreement. is resource mechanism has been available in discussions on political 
participation and transitional justice, where international experience has proved invaluable. 
International input has played a positive role in bringing lessons and experiences learned 
from other peace processes around the world to bear on Colombia’s situation, and oering 
the parties a variety of solutions and ideas to the tactical and strategic dilemmas of the talks.
Another important feature of the peace process is the role played by the guarantor countries, 
Norway and Cuba, and by the observer countries, Chile and Venezuela. e guarantors’ role 
is to ensure that both parties abide by the agreed-upon rules, as trust can wane as negotiations 
wear on (Beittel 2013: 27). ere are also observers whose role is to clarify the disputed 
points in the case of a crisis that may lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations 
(Armengol 2013, 6). However, there is no appointed international mediator in the 
Colombian process (Gienger 2013). e role of these four countries has been key in settling 
disputes during negotiations; building trust between the parties; and solving the many 
day-to-day logistical issues.
Arranging a positive and supportive international context has been indispensable to the peace 
process because it helped shore up external legitimacy; gave much-needed access to lessons 
learnt in other countries; and served as an important indicator of progress for an 
often-incredulous public opinion at home. Negotiation of the topics in the framework 
agreement, especially those of illicit drugs and transitional justice, will have important 
international ramications. e international ambience set up before and kept in place during 
the process will certainly conduce to dealing with them in a constructive and positive way.  
PREPARATION, STRUCTURE AND DESIGN.
e Colombian peace talks are an example of preparing and designing a negotiation 
adequately to reach the desired endgame. During the exploratory talks, or what is commonly 
known in the literature as “talks about talks”, the parties agreed on three features that have 
proved crucial for the development of the public phase of the process. 
INTRODUCTION.
irty years ago the Colombian war was a forgotten internal conict, neglected by the 
international community as being complicated, entangled with the transnational cocaine 
trade, and rooted in the bygone era of the Cold War. e Colombian conict was dicult to 
understand and politically too sensitive to intervene into in any way that might contribute to 
a lasting solution. 
During the last four years the Colombian government and the FARC-EP left-wing guerrillas 
have been engaged in peace talks with the aim of ending the armed violence. Currently, the 
parties have reached unprecedented agreement on four of the six topics of negotiation set at 
the beginning of the peace talks in a framework agenda (General Agreement, 2012): a 
comprehensive agrarian development policy; political participation; a solution to the problem 
of illicit drugs; and victims’ rights and transitional justice. It is the rst time in the history of 
Colombia that the government and the FARC-EP have reached such agreements. Parties are 
now working on the issues of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) along 
with implementation, public consultation, and verication mechanisms. Moreover, as part of 
a programme of condence building measures (CBM), the parties are working together on 
small demining projects in the remote rural areas of Antioquia and Meta. Recently, the leaders 
of the two sides, President Juan Manuel Santos and Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri (alias 
“Timochenko”) jointly announced from Havana an agreement to sign a nal peace deal on the 
23rd of March 2016, and to start the DDR process two months thereafter. 
During the negotiations both sides deployed a number of innovative strategies and 
techniques that are setting new standards in the eld of conict resolution. ese new 
approaches are already informing debates at the regional and global levels over issues related 
to peace-making, peace-building, security, human rights, and international law. Other 
countries aiming to end conict through negotiation and dialogue are studying the 
Colombian approach in order to learn lessons, good practices, and also what to avoid both in 
the design of and during the negotiations. e aim of this policy brief is to advance the debate 
by describing and discussing three of the key lessons that have emerge along the way from the 
Colombian peace process: the role of diplomacy; the importance of preparation and design 
of the negotiating context; and the inclusion of victims’ rights as a core subject of the 
negotiation. I have chosen specically these three critical elements because they speak directly 
to issues faced by other countries in the Global South which stand on the verge of a peace 
process: how to manage the international political and legal context, and how to prepare, 
develop and deliver a successful peace process so as to end intractable conicts with millions 
of victims.
During conict, irregular armies, mainly FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas, waged war on the 
State and paramilitary forces throughout most of the country. e Colombian situation is 
one of the longest-running internal armed conicts in the world. As the following gures 
suggest, this devastating confrontation has been active for over ve decades and its magnitude 
was, and still is greater than many major inter-state wars in the world.
• As at the end of 2014, 38 million people around the world had been forced to ee their 
homes by armed conict. Colombia ranks second in the world according to the number of 
internally displaced people (IDP), with around 6 million IDPs, only surpassed by Syria with 
7.6 million. Iraq holds third place with 3.3 million. e IDP population of Colombia is 
equivalent to the whole population of Singapore or Denmark (IDMC, 2015).
• e Colombian government’s reparations programme set up in 2011 has so far registered 
7.7 million victims of displacement, murder, torture, sexual violence, disappearance and 
kidnapping, and other grave violations of human rights. is tally implies that almost 14% 
of the total population has suered directly from the conict and consider themselves victims 
(Colombia, Unidad de Victimas, 2015).
• Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of landmine victims; only Afghanistan and 
Cambodia have more victims of landmines (Colombia, PAICMA, 2015). 
• 220,000 killings have been registered during the conict, 80% of them civilians (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). is includes three Presidential candidates, one 
Attorney General, one Minister of Justice, 200 judges, 175 Mayors and sixteen Congressmen 
who were assassinated during the conict.
• Colombia has registered 100,000 victims of involuntary ‘disappearance’, a sum equal to all 
reported cases under the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile and Brazil combined (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). 
• 3,000 militants of a single political party, the Unión Patriótica, were killed in a period of ten 
years during the internal war (Dudley, 2006).  
• e authorities have registered 39,058 kidnappings in the period between 1970 and 2010. 
is implies that, during that period, one person was abducted every 12 hours for political or 
economic ends (Colombia, Centro de Memoria Historica, Informe Secuestro 2013). 
• Governmental authorities and non-governmental organisations together have registered 
about 5,000 extrajudicial killings carried out by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.
An important feature of the Colombian peace process is that it has been exclusively led by the 
national government (Haspeslagh, 2015); while at the same time interactively engaging third 
parties and the international community as a whole. e role played by diplomacy partially 
explains why the peace eort is moving forward and achieving success; the international 
community as a whole and many leading states, which have become part of the process, have 
been a key to progress. 
From the beginning of his term in 2010, President Santos recognised that Colombia had to 
reboot its foreign policy and rebuild diplomatic ties with the world at large and with the 
Latin American region, especially its close neighbours Venezuela and Ecuador. e 
government of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) had escalated confrontations with other states in 
the region, accusing them of harbouring and supporting “terrorists”. At the global level, the 
international community had mistrusted the Colombian government because of its poor 
record on human rights, corruption, and for some, for its alignment with the Bush 
Administration during the rst years of the “war on terror”.  In early 2010 the international 
context was not appropriate to start negotiations to end one of the longest conicts of the 
Western Hemisphere, one heavily inuenced by the international drug trade, and one in 
which FARC-EP, the Colombian military forces, and various the paramilitaries were all 
involved in war international crimes. 
President Juan Manuel Santos and his Ministers knew that if a peace agreement were reached, 
the outcome would impact many foreign political agendas, such as US relations with Cuba 
and Venezuela, the limits of international criminal law, and the global debate over the war on 
drugs, among others. is is why Santos has been active and very successful in changing the 
negative trend inherited from the past. All nations in South America now fully support the 
Colombian peace process, and many countries around the world are ready to contribute to 
the implementation and verication of the nal agreements on matters ranging from 
investment in rural infrastructure, to reintegration of ex-combatants, to victims’ rights. 
Diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador were rebuilt and trust restored to the point 
that Venezuela could be accepted as a sponsor of the peace talks. Colombian diplomacy was 
strategic enough to enlist and appoint Cuba as the host country and guarantor of the process, 
alongside Norway, while keeping the US on board. So far, the USA, UNASUR, the European 
Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations have appointed special envoys to the 
process, which suggests a growing interest in the outcome and a commitment to addressing 
the challenges thereof. For example, when US Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Bernie 
Aronson the US Special Envoy, he stated: 
After a long year of negotiations on the topic of victims’ rights and transitional justice, the 
parties agreed three key elements of a broader transitional justice regime. In June 2015 they 
agreed the creation of a Truth Commission. On the 23rd of September 2015 the President of 
Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, and the FARC-EP’s Timochenko announced an agreement 
to create a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a mechanism to investigate, prosecute and punish 
international crimes. Finally, on the 18th of October 2015, the delegations announced an 
agreement to create a specialised unit (in addition to the CBM mentioned above) to search 
for people who disappeared as a result of the conict, which will start operations after the 
peace agreement, is signed.
Victims’ participation has been essential to the delegations’ work and to the peace process as 
a whole. e views expressed by victims are currently informing many agreements on the 
topic. Putting victims’ rights at the centre of the peace process has been one of the main 
contributions of the Colombian peace process.
CONCLUSION.
According to many experts, Colombia is currently the main peace process in the world and a 
cynosure of international peace-building. e Colombian case is proof that protracted 
internal armed conict can be addressed through dialogue (Herbolzheimer, 2014). I have 
discussed three main contributions that have emerging from the Colombian process: (i) a role 
for active diplomacy to enable a respectful international engagement, while at the same time 
conserving national ownership of the process; (ii) a robust strategic plan that observes the 
dierence between negotiating the end of the conict and building peace, between peace 
talks and the peace process; (iii) the commitment to victims’ rights, which has led to a 
national and global debate over the possibilities and limits of applying international criminal 
law in the context of peace negotiations, and the meaning of reconciliation. Colombia is a 
timely reference for a global community standing at the crossroads of ways to address 
complex violence in the age of accountability. 
e treatment given to diplomacy, the importance of contextual preparation and design, and 
the inclusion of victims’ rights as a central issue all evidence that Colombia’s peace process is 
setting new standards in many elds and is becoming an exemplar for peace endeavours 
around the world. Colombia is developing a new model that other countries, especially in the 
Global South, can adopt to satisfy the increasing global demands for accountability, while 
also helping those in conict to achieve a stable and lasting peace.
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might be harmonised with the right of states to pursue peace for their peoples and future 
generations. Currently, both parties are aiming for a peace deal that looks to the future but 
also recognises and acknowledges what happened in the past. ere is a common 
understanding that in order to initiate the peace-building phase, not only the parties to the 
conict but also the whole population must face the past in a constructive, reective and 
comprehensive way. 
To carry out the principle of prioritising victim’s rights, the parties have created three 
mechanisms to empower victims to take their rightful place in the talks. e Colombian 
peace process is a world-class example of how victims can participate directly in peace talks. 
In past peace processes around the world, victims and their organisations only had a chance 
to be involved after an agreement was reached, either participating in truth commissions or 
in trials against perpetrators. In the Colombian process, victims have been actively 
participating from the outset. 
e rst mechanism created was a direct channel, via electronic or conventional mail, for 
sending proposals to both delegations, so that victims could directly contribute to the drafting 
of the agreements. To date, the government and FARC-EP have received 24,475 proposals 
regarding victims’ rights issues (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e second mechanism was participation in several events in Colombia expressly created for 
victims to impact the negotiations in Cuba. e delegations appointed a collegiate third 
party, composed of the United Nations, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and the 
Catholic Church, to organise regional events where victims from all over the country could 
deliver their views, expectations and proposals. ese events where attended by 3,162 victims 
and 4,617 victims’ organisations, from whom the parties received an additional 22,146 
proposals (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e third mechanism consisted of public hearings in Havana, where victims were invited to 
engage directly with both delegations. e sessions took place before and during the 
discussion of victims’ rights and transitional justice with the aim of hearing victims in person 
tell of their expectations and demands, in hopes that this would enlighten the talks while they 
were still on going. In ve hearings, sixty victims from dierent regions, who had suered 
diverse violations of their rights at the hands of many armed actors, were able to confront the 
delegations and by their narratives convey their suering, expectations and needs. is 
unprecedented mechanism was pivotal for starting the dicult negotiations about how to 
deal with the past in Colombia.
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First, the government and FARC-EP agreed that the goal of the negotiation was simply to put 
an end to armed conict, rather than to “make peace” in any positive sense. is may sound 
obvious, but it is essential to manage internal and external expectations of what a process can 
achieve. In past attempts, Colombia governments “sold” peace talks to the public as a 
panacea, promising that the peace agreement would instantly bring about development and 
other benets besides the silencing of guns. is proved to be a mistake insofar as adversarial 
parties could simply not deliver on this process, damaging the government’s popularity and 
credibility and defrauding the public’s expectations. By contrast, the government’s simple 
agreement with FARC-EP to limit the desired outcome proved a powerful focal point, such 
that from the outset the political will existed to seek common ground. e framework sets an 
agenda with the clear objective of ending political violence in order to give way to a 
peace-building phase, namely where the agreements will be implemented with the 
participation of the whole population on their own territories. e framework agenda, agreed 
in the secret phase of the talks, was designed to include only the topics necessary to guarantee 
an end to armed conict and to lay the basis for a separate peace-building phase. e six 
topics mentioned above were chosen because both sides agreed that putting these reforms and 
mechanisms in place would end political violence and allow peace to ourish in Colombia. 
e parties agreed not only on the desired outcome, but also on a shared vision of the 
sequencing of the process: 
• Phase One – the exploratory secret talks, which lasted around six months; 
• Phase Two – the public talks, which were announced at a public event in Oslo, Norway in 
October 2012; and 
• Phase ree – the beginning of the “transition” and the local implementation of the 
agreements (also known as the territorial peace-building stage). 
e second feature of the talks was that, against all odds, the government and FARC-EP’s 
agreed agenda was clear and concise: it comprised just six topics (viz. ve substantive topics 
and one procedural point on implementation, verication and endorsement). is evidenced 
the will of the parties to reach a concrete outcome in a relevant time-frame by engaging a 
nite number of issues. Limiting the agenda proved absolutely essential to organising the 
process in Havana. e xed agenda has been valuable above all for separating the 
often-technical talks from the more political deliberations taking place within the 
appropriate institutions of Colombian democracy. Of course all six issues are tightly related 
to matters o the negotiating table (e.g., agrarian policy, the transitional justice mechanisms 
for national military forces, the policy on the war on drugs), but the wording of the agenda 
has been the criteria separating the conversations taking place in Cuba and in Colombia.  
e third key feature of the peace process design is the operational rulebook included in the 
framework agenda. is regulates issues of condentiality; the interaction of the parties with 
the media during negotiations; the talks’ outreach strategy; the authorised number of 
delegates of each party; the creation of participation mechanisms for civil society; and many 
other procedural issues that, if not regulated, could easily derail or obstruct the negotiations. 
For example, Rule VI states, “A mechanism for jointly communicating progress made by the 
Table shall be set up. Discussions held at the Table shall not be made public and an ecient 
communications strategy shall be implemented”. 
e design and preparation of the Colombian peace process is setting a new standard for 
future peace talks around the world. e Colombian case has shown that a well thought-out 
process can prove an advantage for both parties. It gives hope that most crises are solvable on 
the basis of the rules and mechanisms established in a framework agenda, as these initial 
agreements give the whole subsequent negotiation stability by providing a common ground 
and a sense of predictability and common purpose.
VICTIM’S RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PARTICIPATION.
Victim’s rights and the question of how to deal with the legacy of the past have been neglected 
or poorly managed in many peace processes around the world, because of their complexity 
and sensitivity. Disputes over how to deal with the grievances of warring parties often prove 
to be a deal-breaker. Many negotiations have chosen to leave the issue of victim’s rights to 
future political debate, to avoid “contaminating” the process with “insoluble” issues that 
might derail it. is stems from a specious contradiction between justice and peace. Past trials 
at peace-making have given priority to reaching the peace agreement, regardless of justice, 
truth or reparations. Experience has exposed this approach as fundamentally awed, because 
postponing the demands of justice to future generations, and leaving unattended the seeds of 
potential conict, achieves only an unstable and short-lived peace. 
e Colombian peace process dees this approach. Both parties have agreed from the start 
that victims’ rights must be a distinct and central issue on the agenda. is acknowledgement 
responds to the sheer magnitude of human suering in the country: there are seven million 
victims of the various warring parties so far, 80% of whom are civilians. e government and 
FARC-EP recognised that an agreement that did not place victims’ rights at its core would be 
not only be unlawful, but also immoral, illegitimate and ephemeral. International law as it 
stands today provides for justice, truth and reparations to the victims of internationally 
recognised crimes. In acknowledgement of the value of the Colombian case, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is looking closely at it to understand how international criminal law 
Another key innovation of the Colombian peace process regarding international involvement 
is the participation role of international advisors. Both sides of the table have access to teams 
of international experts who can advise them on various matters, as provided by the 
framework agreement. is resource mechanism has been available in discussions on political 
participation and transitional justice, where international experience has proved invaluable. 
International input has played a positive role in bringing lessons and experiences learned 
from other peace processes around the world to bear on Colombia’s situation, and oering 
the parties a variety of solutions and ideas to the tactical and strategic dilemmas of the talks.
Another important feature of the peace process is the role played by the guarantor countries, 
Norway and Cuba, and by the observer countries, Chile and Venezuela. e guarantors’ role 
is to ensure that both parties abide by the agreed-upon rules, as trust can wane as negotiations 
wear on (Beittel 2013: 27). ere are also observers whose role is to clarify the disputed 
points in the case of a crisis that may lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations 
(Armengol 2013, 6). However, there is no appointed international mediator in the 
Colombian process (Gienger 2013). e role of these four countries has been key in settling 
disputes during negotiations; building trust between the parties; and solving the many 
day-to-day logistical issues.
Arranging a positive and supportive international context has been indispensable to the peace 
process because it helped shore up external legitimacy; gave much-needed access to lessons 
learnt in other countries; and served as an important indicator of progress for an 
often-incredulous public opinion at home. Negotiation of the topics in the framework 
agreement, especially those of illicit drugs and transitional justice, will have important 
international ramications. e international ambience set up before and kept in place during 
the process will certainly conduce to dealing with them in a constructive and positive way.  
PREPARATION, STRUCTURE AND DESIGN.
e Colombian peace talks are an example of preparing and designing a negotiation 
adequately to reach the desired endgame. During the exploratory talks, or what is commonly 
known in the literature as “talks about talks”, the parties agreed on three features that have 
proved crucial for the development of the public phase of the process. 
During conict, irregular armies, mainly FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas, waged war on the 
State and paramilitary forces throughout most of the country. e Colombian situation is 
one of the longest-running internal armed conicts in the world. As the following gures 
suggest, this devastating confrontation has been active for over ve decades and its magnitude 
was, and still is greater than many major inter-state wars in the world.
• As at the end of 2014, 38 million people around the world had been forced to ee their 
homes by armed conict. Colombia ranks second in the world according to the number of 
internally displaced people (IDP), with around 6 million IDPs, only surpassed by Syria with 
7.6 million. Iraq holds third place with 3.3 million. e IDP population of Colombia is 
equivalent to the whole population of Singapore or Denmark (IDMC, 2015).
• e Colombian government’s reparations programme set up in 2011 has so far registered 
7.7 million victims of displacement, murder, torture, sexual violence, disappearance and 
kidnapping, and other grave violations of human rights. is tally implies that almost 14% 
of the total population has suered directly from the conict and consider themselves victims 
(Colombia, Unidad de Victimas, 2015).
• Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of landmine victims; only Afghanistan and 
Cambodia have more victims of landmines (Colombia, PAICMA, 2015). 
• 220,000 killings have been registered during the conict, 80% of them civilians (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). is includes three Presidential candidates, one 
Attorney General, one Minister of Justice, 200 judges, 175 Mayors and sixteen Congressmen 
who were assassinated during the conict.
• Colombia has registered 100,000 victims of involuntary ‘disappearance’, a sum equal to all 
reported cases under the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile and Brazil combined (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). 
• 3,000 militants of a single political party, the Unión Patriótica, were killed in a period of ten 
years during the internal war (Dudley, 2006).  
• e authorities have registered 39,058 kidnappings in the period between 1970 and 2010. 
is implies that, during that period, one person was abducted every 12 hours for political or 
economic ends (Colombia, Centro de Memoria Historica, Informe Secuestro 2013). 
• Governmental authorities and non-governmental organisations together have registered 
about 5,000 extrajudicial killings carried out by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.
An important feature of the Colombian peace process is that it has been exclusively led by the 
national government (Haspeslagh, 2015); while at the same time interactively engaging third 
parties and the international community as a whole. e role played by diplomacy partially 
explains why the peace eort is moving forward and achieving success; the international 
community as a whole and many leading states, which have become part of the process, have 
been a key to progress. 
From the beginning of his term in 2010, President Santos recognised that Colombia had to 
reboot its foreign policy and rebuild diplomatic ties with the world at large and with the 
Latin American region, especially its close neighbours Venezuela and Ecuador. e 
government of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) had escalated confrontations with other states in 
the region, accusing them of harbouring and supporting “terrorists”. At the global level, the 
international community had mistrusted the Colombian government because of its poor 
record on human rights, corruption, and for some, for its alignment with the Bush 
Administration during the rst years of the “war on terror”.  In early 2010 the international 
context was not appropriate to start negotiations to end one of the longest conicts of the 
Western Hemisphere, one heavily inuenced by the international drug trade, and one in 
which FARC-EP, the Colombian military forces, and various the paramilitaries were all 
involved in war international crimes. 
President Juan Manuel Santos and his Ministers knew that if a peace agreement were reached, 
the outcome would impact many foreign political agendas, such as US relations with Cuba 
and Venezuela, the limits of international criminal law, and the global debate over the war on 
drugs, among others. is is why Santos has been active and very successful in changing the 
negative trend inherited from the past. All nations in South America now fully support the 
Colombian peace process, and many countries around the world are ready to contribute to 
the implementation and verication of the nal agreements on matters ranging from 
investment in rural infrastructure, to reintegration of ex-combatants, to victims’ rights. 
Diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador were rebuilt and trust restored to the point 
that Venezuela could be accepted as a sponsor of the peace talks. Colombian diplomacy was 
strategic enough to enlist and appoint Cuba as the host country and guarantor of the process, 
alongside Norway, while keeping the US on board. So far, the USA, UNASUR, the European 
Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations have appointed special envoys to the 
process, which suggests a growing interest in the outcome and a commitment to addressing 
the challenges thereof. For example, when US Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Bernie 
Aronson the US Special Envoy, he stated: 
After a long year of negotiations on the topic of victims’ rights and transitional justice, the 
parties agreed three key elements of a broader transitional justice regime. In June 2015 they 
agreed the creation of a Truth Commission. On the 23rd of September 2015 the President of 
Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, and the FARC-EP’s Timochenko announced an agreement 
to create a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a mechanism to investigate, prosecute and punish 
international crimes. Finally, on the 18th of October 2015, the delegations announced an 
agreement to create a specialised unit (in addition to the CBM mentioned above) to search 
for people who disappeared as a result of the conict, which will start operations after the 
peace agreement, is signed.
Victims’ participation has been essential to the delegations’ work and to the peace process as 
a whole. e views expressed by victims are currently informing many agreements on the 
topic. Putting victims’ rights at the centre of the peace process has been one of the main 
contributions of the Colombian peace process.
CONCLUSION.
According to many experts, Colombia is currently the main peace process in the world and a 
cynosure of international peace-building. e Colombian case is proof that protracted 
internal armed conict can be addressed through dialogue (Herbolzheimer, 2014). I have 
discussed three main contributions that have emerging from the Colombian process: (i) a role 
for active diplomacy to enable a respectful international engagement, while at the same time 
conserving national ownership of the process; (ii) a robust strategic plan that observes the 
dierence between negotiating the end of the conict and building peace, between peace 
talks and the peace process; (iii) the commitment to victims’ rights, which has led to a 
national and global debate over the possibilities and limits of applying international criminal 
law in the context of peace negotiations, and the meaning of reconciliation. Colombia is a 
timely reference for a global community standing at the crossroads of ways to address 
complex violence in the age of accountability. 
e treatment given to diplomacy, the importance of contextual preparation and design, and 
the inclusion of victims’ rights as a central issue all evidence that Colombia’s peace process is 
setting new standards in many elds and is becoming an exemplar for peace endeavours 
around the world. Colombia is developing a new model that other countries, especially in the 
Global South, can adopt to satisfy the increasing global demands for accountability, while 
also helping those in conict to achieve a stable and lasting peace.
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might be harmonised with the right of states to pursue peace for their peoples and future 
generations. Currently, both parties are aiming for a peace deal that looks to the future but 
also recognises and acknowledges what happened in the past. ere is a common 
understanding that in order to initiate the peace-building phase, not only the parties to the 
conict but also the whole population must face the past in a constructive, reective and 
comprehensive way. 
To carry out the principle of prioritising victim’s rights, the parties have created three 
mechanisms to empower victims to take their rightful place in the talks. e Colombian 
peace process is a world-class example of how victims can participate directly in peace talks. 
In past peace processes around the world, victims and their organisations only had a chance 
to be involved after an agreement was reached, either participating in truth commissions or 
in trials against perpetrators. In the Colombian process, victims have been actively 
participating from the outset. 
e rst mechanism created was a direct channel, via electronic or conventional mail, for 
sending proposals to both delegations, so that victims could directly contribute to the drafting 
of the agreements. To date, the government and FARC-EP have received 24,475 proposals 
regarding victims’ rights issues (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e second mechanism was participation in several events in Colombia expressly created for 
victims to impact the negotiations in Cuba. e delegations appointed a collegiate third 
party, composed of the United Nations, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and the 
Catholic Church, to organise regional events where victims from all over the country could 
deliver their views, expectations and proposals. ese events where attended by 3,162 victims 
and 4,617 victims’ organisations, from whom the parties received an additional 22,146 
proposals (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e third mechanism consisted of public hearings in Havana, where victims were invited to 
engage directly with both delegations. e sessions took place before and during the 
discussion of victims’ rights and transitional justice with the aim of hearing victims in person 
tell of their expectations and demands, in hopes that this would enlighten the talks while they 
were still on going. In ve hearings, sixty victims from dierent regions, who had suered 
diverse violations of their rights at the hands of many armed actors, were able to confront the 
delegations and by their narratives convey their suering, expectations and needs. is 
unprecedented mechanism was pivotal for starting the dicult negotiations about how to 
deal with the past in Colombia.
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First, the government and FARC-EP agreed that the goal of the negotiation was simply to put 
an end to armed conict, rather than to “make peace” in any positive sense. is may sound 
obvious, but it is essential to manage internal and external expectations of what a process can 
achieve. In past attempts, Colombia governments “sold” peace talks to the public as a 
panacea, promising that the peace agreement would instantly bring about development and 
other benets besides the silencing of guns. is proved to be a mistake insofar as adversarial 
parties could simply not deliver on this process, damaging the government’s popularity and 
credibility and defrauding the public’s expectations. By contrast, the government’s simple 
agreement with FARC-EP to limit the desired outcome proved a powerful focal point, such 
that from the outset the political will existed to seek common ground. e framework sets an 
agenda with the clear objective of ending political violence in order to give way to a 
peace-building phase, namely where the agreements will be implemented with the 
participation of the whole population on their own territories. e framework agenda, agreed 
in the secret phase of the talks, was designed to include only the topics necessary to guarantee 
an end to armed conict and to lay the basis for a separate peace-building phase. e six 
topics mentioned above were chosen because both sides agreed that putting these reforms and 
mechanisms in place would end political violence and allow peace to ourish in Colombia. 
e parties agreed not only on the desired outcome, but also on a shared vision of the 
sequencing of the process: 
• Phase One – the exploratory secret talks, which lasted around six months; 
• Phase Two – the public talks, which were announced at a public event in Oslo, Norway in 
October 2012; and 
• Phase ree – the beginning of the “transition” and the local implementation of the 
agreements (also known as the territorial peace-building stage). 
e second feature of the talks was that, against all odds, the government and FARC-EP’s 
agreed agenda was clear and concise: it comprised just six topics (viz. ve substantive topics 
and one procedural point on implementation, verication and endorsement). is evidenced 
the will of the parties to reach a concrete outcome in a relevant time-frame by engaging a 
nite number of issues. Limiting the agenda proved absolutely essential to organising the 
process in Havana. e xed agenda has been valuable above all for separating the 
often-technical talks from the more political deliberations taking place within the 
appropriate institutions of Colombian democracy. Of course all six issues are tightly related 
to matters o the negotiating table (e.g., agrarian policy, the transitional justice mechanisms 
for national military forces, the policy on the war on drugs), but the wording of the agenda 
has been the criteria separating the conversations taking place in Cuba and in Colombia.  
e third key feature of the peace process design is the operational rulebook included in the 
framework agenda. is regulates issues of condentiality; the interaction of the parties with 
the media during negotiations; the talks’ outreach strategy; the authorised number of 
delegates of each party; the creation of participation mechanisms for civil society; and many 
other procedural issues that, if not regulated, could easily derail or obstruct the negotiations. 
For example, Rule VI states, “A mechanism for jointly communicating progress made by the 
Table shall be set up. Discussions held at the Table shall not be made public and an ecient 
communications strategy shall be implemented”. 
e design and preparation of the Colombian peace process is setting a new standard for 
future peace talks around the world. e Colombian case has shown that a well thought-out 
process can prove an advantage for both parties. It gives hope that most crises are solvable on 
the basis of the rules and mechanisms established in a framework agenda, as these initial 
agreements give the whole subsequent negotiation stability by providing a common ground 
and a sense of predictability and common purpose.
VICTIM’S RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PARTICIPATION.
Victim’s rights and the question of how to deal with the legacy of the past have been neglected 
or poorly managed in many peace processes around the world, because of their complexity 
and sensitivity. Disputes over how to deal with the grievances of warring parties often prove 
to be a deal-breaker. Many negotiations have chosen to leave the issue of victim’s rights to 
future political debate, to avoid “contaminating” the process with “insoluble” issues that 
might derail it. is stems from a specious contradiction between justice and peace. Past trials 
at peace-making have given priority to reaching the peace agreement, regardless of justice, 
truth or reparations. Experience has exposed this approach as fundamentally awed, because 
postponing the demands of justice to future generations, and leaving unattended the seeds of 
potential conict, achieves only an unstable and short-lived peace. 
e Colombian peace process dees this approach. Both parties have agreed from the start 
that victims’ rights must be a distinct and central issue on the agenda. is acknowledgement 
responds to the sheer magnitude of human suering in the country: there are seven million 
victims of the various warring parties so far, 80% of whom are civilians. e government and 
FARC-EP recognised that an agreement that did not place victims’ rights at its core would be 
not only be unlawful, but also immoral, illegitimate and ephemeral. International law as it 
stands today provides for justice, truth and reparations to the victims of internationally 
recognised crimes. In acknowledgement of the value of the Colombian case, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is looking closely at it to understand how international criminal law 
Another key innovation of the Colombian peace process regarding international involvement 
is the participation role of international advisors. Both sides of the table have access to teams 
of international experts who can advise them on various matters, as provided by the 
framework agreement. is resource mechanism has been available in discussions on political 
participation and transitional justice, where international experience has proved invaluable. 
International input has played a positive role in bringing lessons and experiences learned 
from other peace processes around the world to bear on Colombia’s situation, and oering 
the parties a variety of solutions and ideas to the tactical and strategic dilemmas of the talks.
Another important feature of the peace process is the role played by the guarantor countries, 
Norway and Cuba, and by the observer countries, Chile and Venezuela. e guarantors’ role 
is to ensure that both parties abide by the agreed-upon rules, as trust can wane as negotiations 
wear on (Beittel 2013: 27). ere are also observers whose role is to clarify the disputed 
points in the case of a crisis that may lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations 
(Armengol 2013, 6). However, there is no appointed international mediator in the 
Colombian process (Gienger 2013). e role of these four countries has been key in settling 
disputes during negotiations; building trust between the parties; and solving the many 
day-to-day logistical issues.
Arranging a positive and supportive international context has been indispensable to the peace 
process because it helped shore up external legitimacy; gave much-needed access to lessons 
learnt in other countries; and served as an important indicator of progress for an 
often-incredulous public opinion at home. Negotiation of the topics in the framework 
agreement, especially those of illicit drugs and transitional justice, will have important 
international ramications. e international ambience set up before and kept in place during 
the process will certainly conduce to dealing with them in a constructive and positive way.  
PREPARATION, STRUCTURE AND DESIGN.
e Colombian peace talks are an example of preparing and designing a negotiation 
adequately to reach the desired endgame. During the exploratory talks, or what is commonly 
known in the literature as “talks about talks”, the parties agreed on three features that have 
proved crucial for the development of the public phase of the process. 
During conict, irregular armies, mainly FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas, waged war on the 
State and paramilitary forces throughout most of the country. e Colombian situation is 
one of the longest-running internal armed conicts in the world. As the following gures 
suggest, this devastating confrontation has been active for over ve decades and its magnitude 
was, and still is greater than many major inter-state wars in the world.
• As at the end of 2014, 38 million people around the world had been forced to ee their 
homes by armed conict. Colombia ranks second in the world according to the number of 
internally displaced people (IDP), with around 6 million IDPs, only surpassed by Syria with 
7.6 million. Iraq holds third place with 3.3 million. e IDP population of Colombia is 
equivalent to the whole population of Singapore or Denmark (IDMC, 2015).
• e Colombian government’s reparations programme set up in 2011 has so far registered 
7.7 million victims of displacement, murder, torture, sexual violence, disappearance and 
kidnapping, and other grave violations of human rights. is tally implies that almost 14% 
of the total population has suered directly from the conict and consider themselves victims 
(Colombia, Unidad de Victimas, 2015).
• Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of landmine victims; only Afghanistan and 
Cambodia have more victims of landmines (Colombia, PAICMA, 2015). 
• 220,000 killings have been registered during the conict, 80% of them civilians (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). is includes three Presidential candidates, one 
Attorney General, one Minister of Justice, 200 judges, 175 Mayors and sixteen Congressmen 
who were assassinated during the conict.
• Colombia has registered 100,000 victims of involuntary ‘disappearance’, a sum equal to all 
reported cases under the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile and Brazil combined (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). 
• 3,000 militants of a single political party, the Unión Patriótica, were killed in a period of ten 
years during the internal war (Dudley, 2006).  
• e authorities have registered 39,058 kidnappings in the period between 1970 and 2010. 
is implies that, during that period, one person was abducted every 12 hours for political or 
economic ends (Colombia, Centro de Memoria Historica, Informe Secuestro 2013). 
• Governmental authorities and non-governmental organisations together have registered 
about 5,000 extrajudicial killings carried out by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.
An important feature of the Colombian peace process is that it has been exclusively led by the 
national government (Haspeslagh, 2015); while at the same time interactively engaging third 
parties and the international community as a whole. e role played by diplomacy partially 
explains why the peace eort is moving forward and achieving success; the international 
community as a whole and many leading states, which have become part of the process, have 
been a key to progress. 
From the beginning of his term in 2010, President Santos recognised that Colombia had to 
reboot its foreign policy and rebuild diplomatic ties with the world at large and with the 
Latin American region, especially its close neighbours Venezuela and Ecuador. e 
government of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) had escalated confrontations with other states in 
the region, accusing them of harbouring and supporting “terrorists”. At the global level, the 
international community had mistrusted the Colombian government because of its poor 
record on human rights, corruption, and for some, for its alignment with the Bush 
Administration during the rst years of the “war on terror”.  In early 2010 the international 
context was not appropriate to start negotiations to end one of the longest conicts of the 
Western Hemisphere, one heavily inuenced by the international drug trade, and one in 
which FARC-EP, the Colombian military forces, and various the paramilitaries were all 
involved in war international crimes. 
President Juan Manuel Santos and his Ministers knew that if a peace agreement were reached, 
the outcome would impact many foreign political agendas, such as US relations with Cuba 
and Venezuela, the limits of international criminal law, and the global debate over the war on 
drugs, among others. is is why Santos has been active and very successful in changing the 
negative trend inherited from the past. All nations in South America now fully support the 
Colombian peace process, and many countries around the world are ready to contribute to 
the implementation and verication of the nal agreements on matters ranging from 
investment in rural infrastructure, to reintegration of ex-combatants, to victims’ rights. 
Diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador were rebuilt and trust restored to the point 
that Venezuela could be accepted as a sponsor of the peace talks. Colombian diplomacy was 
strategic enough to enlist and appoint Cuba as the host country and guarantor of the process, 
alongside Norway, while keeping the US on board. So far, the USA, UNASUR, the European 
Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations have appointed special envoys to the 
process, which suggests a growing interest in the outcome and a commitment to addressing 
the challenges thereof. For example, when US Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Bernie 
Aronson the US Special Envoy, he stated: 
After a long year of negotiations on the topic of victims’ rights and transitional justice, the 
parties agreed three key elements of a broader transitional justice regime. In June 2015 they 
agreed the creation of a Truth Commission. On the 23rd of September 2015 the President of 
Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, and the FARC-EP’s Timochenko announced an agreement 
to create a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a mechanism to investigate, prosecute and punish 
international crimes. Finally, on the 18th of October 2015, the delegations announced an 
agreement to create a specialised unit (in addition to the CBM mentioned above) to search 
for people who disappeared as a result of the conict, which will start operations after the 
peace agreement, is signed.
Victims’ participation has been essential to the delegations’ work and to the peace process as 
a whole. e views expressed by victims are currently informing many agreements on the 
topic. Putting victims’ rights at the centre of the peace process has been one of the main 
contributions of the Colombian peace process.
CONCLUSION.
According to many experts, Colombia is currently the main peace process in the world and a 
cynosure of international peace-building. e Colombian case is proof that protracted 
internal armed conict can be addressed through dialogue (Herbolzheimer, 2014). I have 
discussed three main contributions that have emerging from the Colombian process: (i) a role 
for active diplomacy to enable a respectful international engagement, while at the same time 
conserving national ownership of the process; (ii) a robust strategic plan that observes the 
dierence between negotiating the end of the conict and building peace, between peace 
talks and the peace process; (iii) the commitment to victims’ rights, which has led to a 
national and global debate over the possibilities and limits of applying international criminal 
law in the context of peace negotiations, and the meaning of reconciliation. Colombia is a 
timely reference for a global community standing at the crossroads of ways to address 
complex violence in the age of accountability. 
e treatment given to diplomacy, the importance of contextual preparation and design, and 
the inclusion of victims’ rights as a central issue all evidence that Colombia’s peace process is 
setting new standards in many elds and is becoming an exemplar for peace endeavours 
around the world. Colombia is developing a new model that other countries, especially in the 
Global South, can adopt to satisfy the increasing global demands for accountability, while 
also helping those in conict to achieve a stable and lasting peace.
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might be harmonised with the right of states to pursue peace for their peoples and future 
generations. Currently, both parties are aiming for a peace deal that looks to the future but 
also recognises and acknowledges what happened in the past. ere is a common 
understanding that in order to initiate the peace-building phase, not only the parties to the 
conict but also the whole population must face the past in a constructive, reective and 
comprehensive way. 
To carry out the principle of prioritising victim’s rights, the parties have created three 
mechanisms to empower victims to take their rightful place in the talks. e Colombian 
peace process is a world-class example of how victims can participate directly in peace talks. 
In past peace processes around the world, victims and their organisations only had a chance 
to be involved after an agreement was reached, either participating in truth commissions or 
in trials against perpetrators. In the Colombian process, victims have been actively 
participating from the outset. 
e rst mechanism created was a direct channel, via electronic or conventional mail, for 
sending proposals to both delegations, so that victims could directly contribute to the drafting 
of the agreements. To date, the government and FARC-EP have received 24,475 proposals 
regarding victims’ rights issues (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e second mechanism was participation in several events in Colombia expressly created for 
victims to impact the negotiations in Cuba. e delegations appointed a collegiate third 
party, composed of the United Nations, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and the 
Catholic Church, to organise regional events where victims from all over the country could 
deliver their views, expectations and proposals. ese events where attended by 3,162 victims 
and 4,617 victims’ organisations, from whom the parties received an additional 22,146 
proposals (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e third mechanism consisted of public hearings in Havana, where victims were invited to 
engage directly with both delegations. e sessions took place before and during the 
discussion of victims’ rights and transitional justice with the aim of hearing victims in person 
tell of their expectations and demands, in hopes that this would enlighten the talks while they 
were still on going. In ve hearings, sixty victims from dierent regions, who had suered 
diverse violations of their rights at the hands of many armed actors, were able to confront the 
delegations and by their narratives convey their suering, expectations and needs. is 
unprecedented mechanism was pivotal for starting the dicult negotiations about how to 
deal with the past in Colombia.
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First, the government and FARC-EP agreed that the goal of the negotiation was simply to put 
an end to armed conict, rather than to “make peace” in any positive sense. is may sound 
obvious, but it is essential to manage internal and external expectations of what a process can 
achieve. In past attempts, Colombia governments “sold” peace talks to the public as a 
panacea, promising that the peace agreement would instantly bring about development and 
other benets besides the silencing of guns. is proved to be a mistake insofar as adversarial 
parties could simply not deliver on this process, damaging the government’s popularity and 
credibility and defrauding the public’s expectations. By contrast, the government’s simple 
agreement with FARC-EP to limit the desired outcome proved a powerful focal point, such 
that from the outset the political will existed to seek common ground. e framework sets an 
agenda with the clear objective of ending political violence in order to give way to a 
peace-building phase, namely where the agreements will be implemented with the 
participation of the whole population on their own territories. e framework agenda, agreed 
in the secret phase of the talks, was designed to include only the topics necessary to guarantee 
an end to armed conict and to lay the basis for a separate peace-building phase. e six 
topics mentioned above were chosen because both sides agreed that putting these reforms and 
mechanisms in place would end political violence and allow peace to ourish in Colombia. 
e parties agreed not only on the desired outcome, but also on a shared vision of the 
sequencing of the process: 
• Phase One – the exploratory secret talks, which lasted around six months; 
• Phase Two – the public talks, which were announced at a public event in Oslo, Norway in 
October 2012; and 
• Phase ree – the beginning of the “transition” and the local implementation of the 
agreements (also known as the territorial peace-building stage). 
e second feature of the talks was that, against all odds, the government and FARC-EP’s 
agreed agenda was clear and concise: it comprised just six topics (viz. ve substantive topics 
and one procedural point on implementation, verication and endorsement). is evidenced 
the will of the parties to reach a concrete outcome in a relevant time-frame by engaging a 
nite number of issues. Limiting the agenda proved absolutely essential to organising the 
process in Havana. e xed agenda has been valuable above all for separating the 
often-technical talks from the more political deliberations taking place within the 
appropriate institutions of Colombian democracy. Of course all six issues are tightly related 
to matters o the negotiating table (e.g., agrarian policy, the transitional justice mechanisms 
for national military forces, the policy on the war on drugs), but the wording of the agenda 
has been the criteria separating the conversations taking place in Cuba and in Colombia.  
e third key feature of the peace process design is the operational rulebook included in the 
framework agenda. is regulates issues of condentiality; the interaction of the parties with 
the media during negotiations; the talks’ outreach strategy; the authorised number of 
delegates of each party; the creation of participation mechanisms for civil society; and many 
other procedural issues that, if not regulated, could easily derail or obstruct the negotiations. 
For example, Rule VI states, “A mechanism for jointly communicating progress made by the 
Table shall be set up. Discussions held at the Table shall not be made public and an ecient 
communications strategy shall be implemented”. 
e design and preparation of the Colombian peace process is setting a new standard for 
future peace talks around the world. e Colombian case has shown that a well thought-out 
process can prove an advantage for both parties. It gives hope that most crises are solvable on 
the basis of the rules and mechanisms established in a framework agenda, as these initial 
agreements give the whole subsequent negotiation stability by providing a common ground 
and a sense of predictability and common purpose.
VICTIM’S RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PARTICIPATION.
Victim’s rights and the question of how to deal with the legacy of the past have been neglected 
or poorly managed in many peace processes around the world, because of their complexity 
and sensitivity. Disputes over how to deal with the grievances of warring parties often prove 
to be a deal-breaker. Many negotiations have chosen to leave the issue of victim’s rights to 
future political debate, to avoid “contaminating” the process with “insoluble” issues that 
might derail it. is stems from a specious contradiction between justice and peace. Past trials 
at peace-making have given priority to reaching the peace agreement, regardless of justice, 
truth or reparations. Experience has exposed this approach as fundamentally awed, because 
postponing the demands of justice to future generations, and leaving unattended the seeds of 
potential conict, achieves only an unstable and short-lived peace. 
e Colombian peace process dees this approach. Both parties have agreed from the start 
that victims’ rights must be a distinct and central issue on the agenda. is acknowledgement 
responds to the sheer magnitude of human suering in the country: there are seven million 
victims of the various warring parties so far, 80% of whom are civilians. e government and 
FARC-EP recognised that an agreement that did not place victims’ rights at its core would be 
not only be unlawful, but also immoral, illegitimate and ephemeral. International law as it 
stands today provides for justice, truth and reparations to the victims of internationally 
recognised crimes. In acknowledgement of the value of the Colombian case, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is looking closely at it to understand how international criminal law 
Another key innovation of the Colombian peace process regarding international involvement 
is the participation role of international advisors. Both sides of the table have access to teams 
of international experts who can advise them on various matters, as provided by the 
framework agreement. is resource mechanism has been available in discussions on political 
participation and transitional justice, where international experience has proved invaluable. 
International input has played a positive role in bringing lessons and experiences learned 
from other peace processes around the world to bear on Colombia’s situation, and oering 
the parties a variety of solutions and ideas to the tactical and strategic dilemmas of the talks.
Another important feature of the peace process is the role played by the guarantor countries, 
Norway and Cuba, and by the observer countries, Chile and Venezuela. e guarantors’ role 
is to ensure that both parties abide by the agreed-upon rules, as trust can wane as negotiations 
wear on (Beittel 2013: 27). ere are also observers whose role is to clarify the disputed 
points in the case of a crisis that may lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations 
(Armengol 2013, 6). However, there is no appointed international mediator in the 
Colombian process (Gienger 2013). e role of these four countries has been key in settling 
disputes during negotiations; building trust between the parties; and solving the many 
day-to-day logistical issues.
Arranging a positive and supportive international context has been indispensable to the peace 
process because it helped shore up external legitimacy; gave much-needed access to lessons 
learnt in other countries; and served as an important indicator of progress for an 
often-incredulous public opinion at home. Negotiation of the topics in the framework 
agreement, especially those of illicit drugs and transitional justice, will have important 
international ramications. e international ambience set up before and kept in place during 
the process will certainly conduce to dealing with them in a constructive and positive way.  
PREPARATION, STRUCTURE AND DESIGN.
e Colombian peace talks are an example of preparing and designing a negotiation 
adequately to reach the desired endgame. During the exploratory talks, or what is commonly 
known in the literature as “talks about talks”, the parties agreed on three features that have 
proved crucial for the development of the public phase of the process. 
During conict, irregular armies, mainly FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas, waged war on the 
State and paramilitary forces throughout most of the country. e Colombian situation is 
one of the longest-running internal armed conicts in the world. As the following gures 
suggest, this devastating confrontation has been active for over ve decades and its magnitude 
was, and still is greater than many major inter-state wars in the world.
• As at the end of 2014, 38 million people around the world had been forced to ee their 
homes by armed conict. Colombia ranks second in the world according to the number of 
internally displaced people (IDP), with around 6 million IDPs, only surpassed by Syria with 
7.6 million. Iraq holds third place with 3.3 million. e IDP population of Colombia is 
equivalent to the whole population of Singapore or Denmark (IDMC, 2015).
• e Colombian government’s reparations programme set up in 2011 has so far registered 
7.7 million victims of displacement, murder, torture, sexual violence, disappearance and 
kidnapping, and other grave violations of human rights. is tally implies that almost 14% 
of the total population has suered directly from the conict and consider themselves victims 
(Colombia, Unidad de Victimas, 2015).
• Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of landmine victims; only Afghanistan and 
Cambodia have more victims of landmines (Colombia, PAICMA, 2015). 
• 220,000 killings have been registered during the conict, 80% of them civilians (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). is includes three Presidential candidates, one 
Attorney General, one Minister of Justice, 200 judges, 175 Mayors and sixteen Congressmen 
who were assassinated during the conict.
• Colombia has registered 100,000 victims of involuntary ‘disappearance’, a sum equal to all 
reported cases under the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile and Brazil combined (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). 
• 3,000 militants of a single political party, the Unión Patriótica, were killed in a period of ten 
years during the internal war (Dudley, 2006).  
• e authorities have registered 39,058 kidnappings in the period between 1970 and 2010. 
is implies that, during that period, one person was abducted every 12 hours for political or 
economic ends (Colombia, Centro de Memoria Historica, Informe Secuestro 2013). 
• Governmental authorities and non-governmental organisations together have registered 
about 5,000 extrajudicial killings carried out by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.
An important feature of the Colombian peace process is that it has been exclusively led by the 
national government (Haspeslagh, 2015); while at the same time interactively engaging third 
parties and the international community as a whole. e role played by diplomacy partially 
explains why the peace eort is moving forward and achieving success; the international 
community as a whole and many leading states, which have become part of the process, have 
been a key to progress. 
From the beginning of his term in 2010, President Santos recognised that Colombia had to 
reboot its foreign policy and rebuild diplomatic ties with the world at large and with the 
Latin American region, especially its close neighbours Venezuela and Ecuador. e 
government of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) had escalated confrontations with other states in 
the region, accusing them of harbouring and supporting “terrorists”. At the global level, the 
international community had mistrusted the Colombian government because of its poor 
record on human rights, corruption, and for some, for its alignment with the Bush 
Administration during the rst years of the “war on terror”.  In early 2010 the international 
context was not appropriate to start negotiations to end one of the longest conicts of the 
Western Hemisphere, one heavily inuenced by the international drug trade, and one in 
which FARC-EP, the Colombian military forces, and various the paramilitaries were all 
involved in war international crimes. 
President Juan Manuel Santos and his Ministers knew that if a peace agreement were reached, 
the outcome would impact many foreign political agendas, such as US relations with Cuba 
and Venezuela, the limits of international criminal law, and the global debate over the war on 
drugs, among others. is is why Santos has been active and very successful in changing the 
negative trend inherited from the past. All nations in South America now fully support the 
Colombian peace process, and many countries around the world are ready to contribute to 
the implementation and verication of the nal agreements on matters ranging from 
investment in rural infrastructure, to reintegration of ex-combatants, to victims’ rights. 
Diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador were rebuilt and trust restored to the point 
that Venezuela could be accepted as a sponsor of the peace talks. Colombian diplomacy was 
strategic enough to enlist and appoint Cuba as the host country and guarantor of the process, 
alongside Norway, while keeping the US on board. So far, the USA, UNASUR, the European 
Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations have appointed special envoys to the 
process, which suggests a growing interest in the outcome and a commitment to addressing 
the challenges thereof. For example, when US Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Bernie 
Aronson the US Special Envoy, he stated: 
After a long year of negotiations on the topic of victims’ rights and transitional justice, the 
parties agreed three key elements of a broader transitional justice regime. In June 2015 they 
agreed the creation of a Truth Commission. On the 23rd of September 2015 the President of 
Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, and the FARC-EP’s Timochenko announced an agreement 
to create a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a mechanism to investigate, prosecute and punish 
international crimes. Finally, on the 18th of October 2015, the delegations announced an 
agreement to create a specialised unit (in addition to the CBM mentioned above) to search 
for people who disappeared as a result of the conict, which will start operations after the 
peace agreement, is signed.
Victims’ participation has been essential to the delegations’ work and to the peace process as 
a whole. e views expressed by victims are currently informing many agreements on the 
topic. Putting victims’ rights at the centre of the peace process has been one of the main 
contributions of the Colombian peace process.
CONCLUSION.
According to many experts, Colombia is currently the main peace process in the world and a 
cynosure of international peace-building. e Colombian case is proof that protracted 
internal armed conict can be addressed through dialogue (Herbolzheimer, 2014). I have 
discussed three main contributions that have emerging from the Colombian process: (i) a role 
for active diplomacy to enable a respectful international engagement, while at the same time 
conserving national ownership of the process; (ii) a robust strategic plan that observes the 
dierence between negotiating the end of the conict and building peace, between peace 
talks and the peace process; (iii) the commitment to victims’ rights, which has led to a 
national and global debate over the possibilities and limits of applying international criminal 
law in the context of peace negotiations, and the meaning of reconciliation. Colombia is a 
timely reference for a global community standing at the crossroads of ways to address 
complex violence in the age of accountability. 
e treatment given to diplomacy, the importance of contextual preparation and design, and 
the inclusion of victims’ rights as a central issue all evidence that Colombia’s peace process is 
setting new standards in many elds and is becoming an exemplar for peace endeavours 
around the world. Colombia is developing a new model that other countries, especially in the 
Global South, can adopt to satisfy the increasing global demands for accountability, while 
also helping those in conict to achieve a stable and lasting peace.
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might be harmonised with the right of states to pursue peace for their peoples and future 
generations. Currently, both parties are aiming for a peace deal that looks to the future but 
also recognises and acknowledges what happened in the past. ere is a common 
understanding that in order to initiate the peace-building phase, not only the parties to the 
conict but also the whole population must face the past in a constructive, reective and 
comprehensive way. 
To carry out the principle of prioritising victim’s rights, the parties have created three 
mechanisms to empower victims to take their rightful place in the talks. e Colombian 
peace process is a world-class example of how victims can participate directly in peace talks. 
In past peace processes around the world, victims and their organisations only had a chance 
to be involved after an agreement was reached, either participating in truth commissions or 
in trials against perpetrators. In the Colombian process, victims have been actively 
participating from the outset. 
e rst mechanism created was a direct channel, via electronic or conventional mail, for 
sending proposals to both delegations, so that victims could directly contribute to the drafting 
of the agreements. To date, the government and FARC-EP have received 24,475 proposals 
regarding victims’ rights issues (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e second mechanism was participation in several events in Colombia expressly created for 
victims to impact the negotiations in Cuba. e delegations appointed a collegiate third 
party, composed of the United Nations, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and the 
Catholic Church, to organise regional events where victims from all over the country could 
deliver their views, expectations and proposals. ese events where attended by 3,162 victims 
and 4,617 victims’ organisations, from whom the parties received an additional 22,146 
proposals (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e third mechanism consisted of public hearings in Havana, where victims were invited to 
engage directly with both delegations. e sessions took place before and during the 
discussion of victims’ rights and transitional justice with the aim of hearing victims in person 
tell of their expectations and demands, in hopes that this would enlighten the talks while they 
were still on going. In ve hearings, sixty victims from dierent regions, who had suered 
diverse violations of their rights at the hands of many armed actors, were able to confront the 
delegations and by their narratives convey their suering, expectations and needs. is 
unprecedented mechanism was pivotal for starting the dicult negotiations about how to 
deal with the past in Colombia.
We also recognized that we needed somebody who had the ability to ensure that the United States is 
eectively contributing to the process and helping the parties come closer to the peace that they seek. 
Needless to say, we wanted someone who knows the region inside out and who has experience in 
negotiations like these. So it is with our condence and the condence of the Colombian Government, 
and the men and women in Colombia who have been working tirelessly and for far too long for an end 
to this war, that I am today pleased to announce that Bernie Aronson will serve as the United States 
special envoy for the Colombian peace process (United States State Department, 2015).
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First, the government and FARC-EP agreed that the goal of the negotiation was simply to put 
an end to armed conict, rather than to “make peace” in any positive sense. is may sound 
obvious, but it is essential to manage internal and external expectations of what a process can 
achieve. In past attempts, Colombia governments “sold” peace talks to the public as a 
panacea, promising that the peace agreement would instantly bring about development and 
other benets besides the silencing of guns. is proved to be a mistake insofar as adversarial 
parties could simply not deliver on this process, damaging the government’s popularity and 
credibility and defrauding the public’s expectations. By contrast, the government’s simple 
agreement with FARC-EP to limit the desired outcome proved a powerful focal point, such 
that from the outset the political will existed to seek common ground. e framework sets an 
agenda with the clear objective of ending political violence in order to give way to a 
peace-building phase, namely where the agreements will be implemented with the 
participation of the whole population on their own territories. e framework agenda, agreed 
in the secret phase of the talks, was designed to include only the topics necessary to guarantee 
an end to armed conict and to lay the basis for a separate peace-building phase. e six 
topics mentioned above were chosen because both sides agreed that putting these reforms and 
mechanisms in place would end political violence and allow peace to ourish in Colombia. 
e parties agreed not only on the desired outcome, but also on a shared vision of the 
sequencing of the process: 
• Phase One – the exploratory secret talks, which lasted around six months; 
• Phase Two – the public talks, which were announced at a public event in Oslo, Norway in 
October 2012; and 
• Phase ree – the beginning of the “transition” and the local implementation of the 
agreements (also known as the territorial peace-building stage). 
e second feature of the talks was that, against all odds, the government and FARC-EP’s 
agreed agenda was clear and concise: it comprised just six topics (viz. ve substantive topics 
and one procedural point on implementation, verication and endorsement). is evidenced 
the will of the parties to reach a concrete outcome in a relevant time-frame by engaging a 
nite number of issues. Limiting the agenda proved absolutely essential to organising the 
process in Havana. e xed agenda has been valuable above all for separating the 
often-technical talks from the more political deliberations taking place within the 
appropriate institutions of Colombian democracy. Of course all six issues are tightly related 
to matters o the negotiating table (e.g., agrarian policy, the transitional justice mechanisms 
for national military forces, the policy on the war on drugs), but the wording of the agenda 
has been the criteria separating the conversations taking place in Cuba and in Colombia.  
e third key feature of the peace process design is the operational rulebook included in the 
framework agenda. is regulates issues of condentiality; the interaction of the parties with 
the media during negotiations; the talks’ outreach strategy; the authorised number of 
delegates of each party; the creation of participation mechanisms for civil society; and many 
other procedural issues that, if not regulated, could easily derail or obstruct the negotiations. 
For example, Rule VI states, “A mechanism for jointly communicating progress made by the 
Table shall be set up. Discussions held at the Table shall not be made public and an ecient 
communications strategy shall be implemented”. 
e design and preparation of the Colombian peace process is setting a new standard for 
future peace talks around the world. e Colombian case has shown that a well thought-out 
process can prove an advantage for both parties. It gives hope that most crises are solvable on 
the basis of the rules and mechanisms established in a framework agenda, as these initial 
agreements give the whole subsequent negotiation stability by providing a common ground 
and a sense of predictability and common purpose.
VICTIM’S RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PARTICIPATION.
Victim’s rights and the question of how to deal with the legacy of the past have been neglected 
or poorly managed in many peace processes around the world, because of their complexity 
and sensitivity. Disputes over how to deal with the grievances of warring parties often prove 
to be a deal-breaker. Many negotiations have chosen to leave the issue of victim’s rights to 
future political debate, to avoid “contaminating” the process with “insoluble” issues that 
might derail it. is stems from a specious contradiction between justice and peace. Past trials 
at peace-making have given priority to reaching the peace agreement, regardless of justice, 
truth or reparations. Experience has exposed this approach as fundamentally awed, because 
postponing the demands of justice to future generations, and leaving unattended the seeds of 
potential conict, achieves only an unstable and short-lived peace. 
e Colombian peace process dees this approach. Both parties have agreed from the start 
that victims’ rights must be a distinct and central issue on the agenda. is acknowledgement 
responds to the sheer magnitude of human suering in the country: there are seven million 
victims of the various warring parties so far, 80% of whom are civilians. e government and 
FARC-EP recognised that an agreement that did not place victims’ rights at its core would be 
not only be unlawful, but also immoral, illegitimate and ephemeral. International law as it 
stands today provides for justice, truth and reparations to the victims of internationally 
recognised crimes. In acknowledgement of the value of the Colombian case, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is looking closely at it to understand how international criminal law 
Another key innovation of the Colombian peace process regarding international involvement 
is the participation role of international advisors. Both sides of the table have access to teams 
of international experts who can advise them on various matters, as provided by the 
framework agreement. is resource mechanism has been available in discussions on political 
participation and transitional justice, where international experience has proved invaluable. 
International input has played a positive role in bringing lessons and experiences learned 
from other peace processes around the world to bear on Colombia’s situation, and oering 
the parties a variety of solutions and ideas to the tactical and strategic dilemmas of the talks.
Another important feature of the peace process is the role played by the guarantor countries, 
Norway and Cuba, and by the observer countries, Chile and Venezuela. e guarantors’ role 
is to ensure that both parties abide by the agreed-upon rules, as trust can wane as negotiations 
wear on (Beittel 2013: 27). ere are also observers whose role is to clarify the disputed 
points in the case of a crisis that may lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations 
(Armengol 2013, 6). However, there is no appointed international mediator in the 
Colombian process (Gienger 2013). e role of these four countries has been key in settling 
disputes during negotiations; building trust between the parties; and solving the many 
day-to-day logistical issues.
Arranging a positive and supportive international context has been indispensable to the peace 
process because it helped shore up external legitimacy; gave much-needed access to lessons 
learnt in other countries; and served as an important indicator of progress for an 
often-incredulous public opinion at home. Negotiation of the topics in the framework 
agreement, especially those of illicit drugs and transitional justice, will have important 
international ramications. e international ambience set up before and kept in place during 
the process will certainly conduce to dealing with them in a constructive and positive way.  
PREPARATION, STRUCTURE AND DESIGN.
e Colombian peace talks are an example of preparing and designing a negotiation 
adequately to reach the desired endgame. During the exploratory talks, or what is commonly 
known in the literature as “talks about talks”, the parties agreed on three features that have 
proved crucial for the development of the public phase of the process. 
During conict, irregular armies, mainly FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas, waged war on the 
State and paramilitary forces throughout most of the country. e Colombian situation is 
one of the longest-running internal armed conicts in the world. As the following gures 
suggest, this devastating confrontation has been active for over ve decades and its magnitude 
was, and still is greater than many major inter-state wars in the world.
• As at the end of 2014, 38 million people around the world had been forced to ee their 
homes by armed conict. Colombia ranks second in the world according to the number of 
internally displaced people (IDP), with around 6 million IDPs, only surpassed by Syria with 
7.6 million. Iraq holds third place with 3.3 million. e IDP population of Colombia is 
equivalent to the whole population of Singapore or Denmark (IDMC, 2015).
• e Colombian government’s reparations programme set up in 2011 has so far registered 
7.7 million victims of displacement, murder, torture, sexual violence, disappearance and 
kidnapping, and other grave violations of human rights. is tally implies that almost 14% 
of the total population has suered directly from the conict and consider themselves victims 
(Colombia, Unidad de Victimas, 2015).
• Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of landmine victims; only Afghanistan and 
Cambodia have more victims of landmines (Colombia, PAICMA, 2015). 
• 220,000 killings have been registered during the conict, 80% of them civilians (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). is includes three Presidential candidates, one 
Attorney General, one Minister of Justice, 200 judges, 175 Mayors and sixteen Congressmen 
who were assassinated during the conict.
• Colombia has registered 100,000 victims of involuntary ‘disappearance’, a sum equal to all 
reported cases under the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile and Brazil combined (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). 
• 3,000 militants of a single political party, the Unión Patriótica, were killed in a period of ten 
years during the internal war (Dudley, 2006).  
• e authorities have registered 39,058 kidnappings in the period between 1970 and 2010. 
is implies that, during that period, one person was abducted every 12 hours for political or 
economic ends (Colombia, Centro de Memoria Historica, Informe Secuestro 2013). 
• Governmental authorities and non-governmental organisations together have registered 
about 5,000 extrajudicial killings carried out by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.
An important feature of the Colombian peace process is that it has been exclusively led by the 
national government (Haspeslagh, 2015); while at the same time interactively engaging third 
parties and the international community as a whole. e role played by diplomacy partially 
explains why the peace eort is moving forward and achieving success; the international 
community as a whole and many leading states, which have become part of the process, have 
been a key to progress. 
From the beginning of his term in 2010, President Santos recognised that Colombia had to 
reboot its foreign policy and rebuild diplomatic ties with the world at large and with the 
Latin American region, especially its close neighbours Venezuela and Ecuador. e 
government of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) had escalated confrontations with other states in 
the region, accusing them of harbouring and supporting “terrorists”. At the global level, the 
international community had mistrusted the Colombian government because of its poor 
record on human rights, corruption, and for some, for its alignment with the Bush 
Administration during the rst years of the “war on terror”.  In early 2010 the international 
context was not appropriate to start negotiations to end one of the longest conicts of the 
Western Hemisphere, one heavily inuenced by the international drug trade, and one in 
which FARC-EP, the Colombian military forces, and various the paramilitaries were all 
involved in war international crimes. 
President Juan Manuel Santos and his Ministers knew that if a peace agreement were reached, 
the outcome would impact many foreign political agendas, such as US relations with Cuba 
and Venezuela, the limits of international criminal law, and the global debate over the war on 
drugs, among others. is is why Santos has been active and very successful in changing the 
negative trend inherited from the past. All nations in South America now fully support the 
Colombian peace process, and many countries around the world are ready to contribute to 
the implementation and verication of the nal agreements on matters ranging from 
investment in rural infrastructure, to reintegration of ex-combatants, to victims’ rights. 
Diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador were rebuilt and trust restored to the point 
that Venezuela could be accepted as a sponsor of the peace talks. Colombian diplomacy was 
strategic enough to enlist and appoint Cuba as the host country and guarantor of the process, 
alongside Norway, while keeping the US on board. So far, the USA, UNASUR, the European 
Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations have appointed special envoys to the 
process, which suggests a growing interest in the outcome and a commitment to addressing 
the challenges thereof. For example, when US Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Bernie 
Aronson the US Special Envoy, he stated: 
After a long year of negotiations on the topic of victims’ rights and transitional justice, the 
parties agreed three key elements of a broader transitional justice regime. In June 2015 they 
agreed the creation of a Truth Commission. On the 23rd of September 2015 the President of 
Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, and the FARC-EP’s Timochenko announced an agreement 
to create a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a mechanism to investigate, prosecute and punish 
international crimes. Finally, on the 18th of October 2015, the delegations announced an 
agreement to create a specialised unit (in addition to the CBM mentioned above) to search 
for people who disappeared as a result of the conict, which will start operations after the 
peace agreement, is signed.
Victims’ participation has been essential to the delegations’ work and to the peace process as 
a whole. e views expressed by victims are currently informing many agreements on the 
topic. Putting victims’ rights at the centre of the peace process has been one of the main 
contributions of the Colombian peace process.
CONCLUSION.
According to many experts, Colombia is currently the main peace process in the world and a 
cynosure of international peace-building. e Colombian case is proof that protracted 
internal armed conict can be addressed through dialogue (Herbolzheimer, 2014). I have 
discussed three main contributions that have emerging from the Colombian process: (i) a role 
for active diplomacy to enable a respectful international engagement, while at the same time 
conserving national ownership of the process; (ii) a robust strategic plan that observes the 
dierence between negotiating the end of the conict and building peace, between peace 
talks and the peace process; (iii) the commitment to victims’ rights, which has led to a 
national and global debate over the possibilities and limits of applying international criminal 
law in the context of peace negotiations, and the meaning of reconciliation. Colombia is a 
timely reference for a global community standing at the crossroads of ways to address 
complex violence in the age of accountability. 
e treatment given to diplomacy, the importance of contextual preparation and design, and 
the inclusion of victims’ rights as a central issue all evidence that Colombia’s peace process is 
setting new standards in many elds and is becoming an exemplar for peace endeavours 
around the world. Colombia is developing a new model that other countries, especially in the 
Global South, can adopt to satisfy the increasing global demands for accountability, while 
also helping those in conict to achieve a stable and lasting peace.
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might be harmonised with the right of states to pursue peace for their peoples and future 
generations. Currently, both parties are aiming for a peace deal that looks to the future but 
also recognises and acknowledges what happened in the past. ere is a common 
understanding that in order to initiate the peace-building phase, not only the parties to the 
conict but also the whole population must face the past in a constructive, reective and 
comprehensive way. 
To carry out the principle of prioritising victim’s rights, the parties have created three 
mechanisms to empower victims to take their rightful place in the talks. e Colombian 
peace process is a world-class example of how victims can participate directly in peace talks. 
In past peace processes around the world, victims and their organisations only had a chance 
to be involved after an agreement was reached, either participating in truth commissions or 
in trials against perpetrators. In the Colombian process, victims have been actively 
participating from the outset. 
e rst mechanism created was a direct channel, via electronic or conventional mail, for 
sending proposals to both delegations, so that victims could directly contribute to the drafting 
of the agreements. To date, the government and FARC-EP have received 24,475 proposals 
regarding victims’ rights issues (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e second mechanism was participation in several events in Colombia expressly created for 
victims to impact the negotiations in Cuba. e delegations appointed a collegiate third 
party, composed of the United Nations, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and the 
Catholic Church, to organise regional events where victims from all over the country could 
deliver their views, expectations and proposals. ese events where attended by 3,162 victims 
and 4,617 victims’ organisations, from whom the parties received an additional 22,146 
proposals (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e third mechanism consisted of public hearings in Havana, where victims were invited to 
engage directly with both delegations. e sessions took place before and during the 
discussion of victims’ rights and transitional justice with the aim of hearing victims in person 
tell of their expectations and demands, in hopes that this would enlighten the talks while they 
were still on going. In ve hearings, sixty victims from dierent regions, who had suered 
diverse violations of their rights at the hands of many armed actors, were able to confront the 
delegations and by their narratives convey their suering, expectations and needs. is 
unprecedented mechanism was pivotal for starting the dicult negotiations about how to 
deal with the past in Colombia.
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First, the government and FARC-EP agreed that the goal of the negotiation was simply to put 
an end to armed conict, rather than to “make peace” in any positive sense. is may sound 
obvious, but it is essential to manage internal and external expectations of what a process can 
achieve. In past attempts, Colombia governments “sold” peace talks to the public as a 
panacea, promising that the peace agreement would instantly bring about development and 
other benets besides the silencing of guns. is proved to be a mistake insofar as adversarial 
parties could simply not deliver on this process, damaging the government’s popularity and 
credibility and defrauding the public’s expectations. By contrast, the government’s simple 
agreement with FARC-EP to limit the desired outcome proved a powerful focal point, such 
that from the outset the political will existed to seek common ground. e framework sets an 
agenda with the clear objective of ending political violence in order to give way to a 
peace-building phase, namely where the agreements will be implemented with the 
participation of the whole population on their own territories. e framework agenda, agreed 
in the secret phase of the talks, was designed to include only the topics necessary to guarantee 
an end to armed conict and to lay the basis for a separate peace-building phase. e six 
topics mentioned above were chosen because both sides agreed that putting these reforms and 
mechanisms in place would end political violence and allow peace to ourish in Colombia. 
e parties agreed not only on the desired outcome, but also on a shared vision of the 
sequencing of the process: 
• Phase One – the exploratory secret talks, which lasted around six months; 
• Phase Two – the public talks, which were announced at a public event in Oslo, Norway in 
October 2012; and 
• Phase ree – the beginning of the “transition” and the local implementation of the 
agreements (also known as the territorial peace-building stage). 
e second feature of the talks was that, against all odds, the government and FARC-EP’s 
agreed agenda was clear and concise: it comprised just six topics (viz. ve substantive topics 
and one procedural point on implementation, verication and endorsement). is evidenced 
the will of the parties to reach a concrete outcome in a relevant time-frame by engaging a 
nite number of issues. Limiting the agenda proved absolutely essential to organising the 
process in Havana. e xed agenda has been valuable above all for separating the 
often-technical talks from the more political deliberations taking place within the 
appropriate institutions of Colombian democracy. Of course all six issues are tightly related 
to matters o the negotiating table (e.g., agrarian policy, the transitional justice mechanisms 
for national military forces, the policy on the war on drugs), but the wording of the agenda 
has been the criteria separating the conversations taking place in Cuba and in Colombia.  
e third key feature of the peace process design is the operational rulebook included in the 
framework agenda. is regulates issues of condentiality; the interaction of the parties with 
the media during negotiations; the talks’ outreach strategy; the authorised number of 
delegates of each party; the creation of participation mechanisms for civil society; and many 
other procedural issues that, if not regulated, could easily derail or obstruct the negotiations. 
For example, Rule VI states, “A mechanism for jointly communicating progress made by the 
Table shall be set up. Discussions held at the Table shall not be made public and an ecient 
communications strategy shall be implemented”. 
e design and preparation of the Colombian peace process is setting a new standard for 
future peace talks around the world. e Colombian case has shown that a well thought-out 
process can prove an advantage for both parties. It gives hope that most crises are solvable on 
the basis of the rules and mechanisms established in a framework agenda, as these initial 
agreements give the whole subsequent negotiation stability by providing a common ground 
and a sense of predictability and common purpose.
VICTIM’S RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PARTICIPATION.
Victim’s rights and the question of how to deal with the legacy of the past have been neglected 
or poorly managed in many peace processes around the world, because of their complexity 
and sensitivity. Disputes over how to deal with the grievances of warring parties often prove 
to be a deal-breaker. Many negotiations have chosen to leave the issue of victim’s rights to 
future political debate, to avoid “contaminating” the process with “insoluble” issues that 
might derail it. is stems from a specious contradiction between justice and peace. Past trials 
at peace-making have given priority to reaching the peace agreement, regardless of justice, 
truth or reparations. Experience has exposed this approach as fundamentally awed, because 
postponing the demands of justice to future generations, and leaving unattended the seeds of 
potential conict, achieves only an unstable and short-lived peace. 
e Colombian peace process dees this approach. Both parties have agreed from the start 
that victims’ rights must be a distinct and central issue on the agenda. is acknowledgement 
responds to the sheer magnitude of human suering in the country: there are seven million 
victims of the various warring parties so far, 80% of whom are civilians. e government and 
FARC-EP recognised that an agreement that did not place victims’ rights at its core would be 
not only be unlawful, but also immoral, illegitimate and ephemeral. International law as it 
stands today provides for justice, truth and reparations to the victims of internationally 
recognised crimes. In acknowledgement of the value of the Colombian case, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is looking closely at it to understand how international criminal law 
Another key innovation of the Colombian peace process regarding international involvement 
is the participation role of international advisors. Both sides of the table have access to teams 
of international experts who can advise them on various matters, as provided by the 
framework agreement. is resource mechanism has been available in discussions on political 
participation and transitional justice, where international experience has proved invaluable. 
International input has played a positive role in bringing lessons and experiences learned 
from other peace processes around the world to bear on Colombia’s situation, and oering 
the parties a variety of solutions and ideas to the tactical and strategic dilemmas of the talks.
Another important feature of the peace process is the role played by the guarantor countries, 
Norway and Cuba, and by the observer countries, Chile and Venezuela. e guarantors’ role 
is to ensure that both parties abide by the agreed-upon rules, as trust can wane as negotiations 
wear on (Beittel 2013: 27). ere are also observers whose role is to clarify the disputed 
points in the case of a crisis that may lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations 
(Armengol 2013, 6). However, there is no appointed international mediator in the 
Colombian process (Gienger 2013). e role of these four countries has been key in settling 
disputes during negotiations; building trust between the parties; and solving the many 
day-to-day logistical issues.
Arranging a positive and supportive international context has been indispensable to the peace 
process because it helped shore up external legitimacy; gave much-needed access to lessons 
learnt in other countries; and served as an important indicator of progress for an 
often-incredulous public opinion at home. Negotiation of the topics in the framework 
agreement, especially those of illicit drugs and transitional justice, will have important 
international ramications. e international ambience set up before and kept in place during 
the process will certainly conduce to dealing with them in a constructive and positive way.  
PREPARATION, STRUCTURE AND DESIGN.
e Colombian peace talks are an example of preparing and designing a negotiation 
adequately to reach the desired endgame. During the exploratory talks, or what is commonly 
known in the literature as “talks about talks”, the parties agreed on three features that have 
proved crucial for the development of the public phase of the process. 
During conict, irregular armies, mainly FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas, waged war on the 
State and paramilitary forces throughout most of the country. e Colombian situation is 
one of the longest-running internal armed conicts in the world. As the following gures 
suggest, this devastating confrontation has been active for over ve decades and its magnitude 
was, and still is greater than many major inter-state wars in the world.
• As at the end of 2014, 38 million people around the world had been forced to ee their 
homes by armed conict. Colombia ranks second in the world according to the number of 
internally displaced people (IDP), with around 6 million IDPs, only surpassed by Syria with 
7.6 million. Iraq holds third place with 3.3 million. e IDP population of Colombia is 
equivalent to the whole population of Singapore or Denmark (IDMC, 2015).
• e Colombian government’s reparations programme set up in 2011 has so far registered 
7.7 million victims of displacement, murder, torture, sexual violence, disappearance and 
kidnapping, and other grave violations of human rights. is tally implies that almost 14% 
of the total population has suered directly from the conict and consider themselves victims 
(Colombia, Unidad de Victimas, 2015).
• Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of landmine victims; only Afghanistan and 
Cambodia have more victims of landmines (Colombia, PAICMA, 2015). 
• 220,000 killings have been registered during the conict, 80% of them civilians (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). is includes three Presidential candidates, one 
Attorney General, one Minister of Justice, 200 judges, 175 Mayors and sixteen Congressmen 
who were assassinated during the conict.
• Colombia has registered 100,000 victims of involuntary ‘disappearance’, a sum equal to all 
reported cases under the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile and Brazil combined (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). 
• 3,000 militants of a single political party, the Unión Patriótica, were killed in a period of ten 
years during the internal war (Dudley, 2006).  
• e authorities have registered 39,058 kidnappings in the period between 1970 and 2010. 
is implies that, during that period, one person was abducted every 12 hours for political or 
economic ends (Colombia, Centro de Memoria Historica, Informe Secuestro 2013). 
• Governmental authorities and non-governmental organisations together have registered 
about 5,000 extrajudicial killings carried out by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.
An important feature of the Colombian peace process is that it has been exclusively led by the 
national government (Haspeslagh, 2015); while at the same time interactively engaging third 
parties and the international community as a whole. e role played by diplomacy partially 
explains why the peace eort is moving forward and achieving success; the international 
community as a whole and many leading states, which have become part of the process, have 
been a key to progress. 
From the beginning of his term in 2010, President Santos recognised that Colombia had to 
reboot its foreign policy and rebuild diplomatic ties with the world at large and with the 
Latin American region, especially its close neighbours Venezuela and Ecuador. e 
government of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) had escalated confrontations with other states in 
the region, accusing them of harbouring and supporting “terrorists”. At the global level, the 
international community had mistrusted the Colombian government because of its poor 
record on human rights, corruption, and for some, for its alignment with the Bush 
Administration during the rst years of the “war on terror”.  In early 2010 the international 
context was not appropriate to start negotiations to end one of the longest conicts of the 
Western Hemisphere, one heavily inuenced by the international drug trade, and one in 
which FARC-EP, the Colombian military forces, and various the paramilitaries were all 
involved in war international crimes. 
President Juan Manuel Santos and his Ministers knew that if a peace agreement were reached, 
the outcome would impact many foreign political agendas, such as US relations with Cuba 
and Venezuela, the limits of international criminal law, and the global debate over the war on 
drugs, among others. is is why Santos has been active and very successful in changing the 
negative trend inherited from the past. All nations in South America now fully support the 
Colombian peace process, and many countries around the world are ready to contribute to 
the implementation and verication of the nal agreements on matters ranging from 
investment in rural infrastructure, to reintegration of ex-combatants, to victims’ rights. 
Diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador were rebuilt and trust restored to the point 
that Venezuela could be accepted as a sponsor of the peace talks. Colombian diplomacy was 
strategic enough to enlist and appoint Cuba as the host country and guarantor of the process, 
alongside Norway, while keeping the US on board. So far, the USA, UNASUR, the European 
Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations have appointed special envoys to the 
process, which suggests a growing interest in the outcome and a commitment to addressing 
the challenges thereof. For example, when US Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Bernie 
Aronson the US Special Envoy, he stated: 
After a long year of negotiations on the topic of victims’ rights and transitional justice, the 
parties agreed three key elements of a broader transitional justice regime. In June 2015 they 
agreed the creation of a Truth Commission. On the 23rd of September 2015 the President of 
Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, and the FARC-EP’s Timochenko announced an agreement 
to create a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a mechanism to investigate, prosecute and punish 
international crimes. Finally, on the 18th of October 2015, the delegations announced an 
agreement to create a specialised unit (in addition to the CBM mentioned above) to search 
for people who disappeared as a result of the conict, which will start operations after the 
peace agreement, is signed.
Victims’ participation has been essential to the delegations’ work and to the peace process as 
a whole. e views expressed by victims are currently informing many agreements on the 
topic. Putting victims’ rights at the centre of the peace process has been one of the main 
contributions of the Colombian peace process.
CONCLUSION.
According to many experts, Colombia is currently the main peace process in the world and a 
cynosure of international peace-building. e Colombian case is proof that protracted 
internal armed conict can be addressed through dialogue (Herbolzheimer, 2014). I have 
discussed three main contributions that have emerging from the Colombian process: (i) a role 
for active diplomacy to enable a respectful international engagement, while at the same time 
conserving national ownership of the process; (ii) a robust strategic plan that observes the 
dierence between negotiating the end of the conict and building peace, between peace 
talks and the peace process; (iii) the commitment to victims’ rights, which has led to a 
national and global debate over the possibilities and limits of applying international criminal 
law in the context of peace negotiations, and the meaning of reconciliation. Colombia is a 
timely reference for a global community standing at the crossroads of ways to address 
complex violence in the age of accountability. 
e treatment given to diplomacy, the importance of contextual preparation and design, and 
the inclusion of victims’ rights as a central issue all evidence that Colombia’s peace process is 
setting new standards in many elds and is becoming an exemplar for peace endeavours 
around the world. Colombia is developing a new model that other countries, especially in the 
Global South, can adopt to satisfy the increasing global demands for accountability, while 
also helping those in conict to achieve a stable and lasting peace.
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might be harmonised with the right of states to pursue peace for their peoples and future 
generations. Currently, both parties are aiming for a peace deal that looks to the future but 
also recognises and acknowledges what happened in the past. ere is a common 
understanding that in order to initiate the peace-building phase, not only the parties to the 
conict but also the whole population must face the past in a constructive, reective and 
comprehensive way. 
To carry out the principle of prioritising victim’s rights, the parties have created three 
mechanisms to empower victims to take their rightful place in the talks. e Colombian 
peace process is a world-class example of how victims can participate directly in peace talks. 
In past peace processes around the world, victims and their organisations only had a chance 
to be involved after an agreement was reached, either participating in truth commissions or 
in trials against perpetrators. In the Colombian process, victims have been actively 
participating from the outset. 
e rst mechanism created was a direct channel, via electronic or conventional mail, for 
sending proposals to both delegations, so that victims could directly contribute to the drafting 
of the agreements. To date, the government and FARC-EP have received 24,475 proposals 
regarding victims’ rights issues (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e second mechanism was participation in several events in Colombia expressly created for 
victims to impact the negotiations in Cuba. e delegations appointed a collegiate third 
party, composed of the United Nations, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and the 
Catholic Church, to organise regional events where victims from all over the country could 
deliver their views, expectations and proposals. ese events where attended by 3,162 victims 
and 4,617 victims’ organisations, from whom the parties received an additional 22,146 
proposals (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e third mechanism consisted of public hearings in Havana, where victims were invited to 
engage directly with both delegations. e sessions took place before and during the 
discussion of victims’ rights and transitional justice with the aim of hearing victims in person 
tell of their expectations and demands, in hopes that this would enlighten the talks while they 
were still on going. In ve hearings, sixty victims from dierent regions, who had suered 
diverse violations of their rights at the hands of many armed actors, were able to confront the 
delegations and by their narratives convey their suering, expectations and needs. is 
unprecedented mechanism was pivotal for starting the dicult negotiations about how to 
deal with the past in Colombia.
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First, the government and FARC-EP agreed that the goal of the negotiation was simply to put 
an end to armed conict, rather than to “make peace” in any positive sense. is may sound 
obvious, but it is essential to manage internal and external expectations of what a process can 
achieve. In past attempts, Colombia governments “sold” peace talks to the public as a 
panacea, promising that the peace agreement would instantly bring about development and 
other benets besides the silencing of guns. is proved to be a mistake insofar as adversarial 
parties could simply not deliver on this process, damaging the government’s popularity and 
credibility and defrauding the public’s expectations. By contrast, the government’s simple 
agreement with FARC-EP to limit the desired outcome proved a powerful focal point, such 
that from the outset the political will existed to seek common ground. e framework sets an 
agenda with the clear objective of ending political violence in order to give way to a 
peace-building phase, namely where the agreements will be implemented with the 
participation of the whole population on their own territories. e framework agenda, agreed 
in the secret phase of the talks, was designed to include only the topics necessary to guarantee 
an end to armed conict and to lay the basis for a separate peace-building phase. e six 
topics mentioned above were chosen because both sides agreed that putting these reforms and 
mechanisms in place would end political violence and allow peace to ourish in Colombia. 
e parties agreed not only on the desired outcome, but also on a shared vision of the 
sequencing of the process: 
• Phase One – the exploratory secret talks, which lasted around six months; 
• Phase Two – the public talks, which were announced at a public event in Oslo, Norway in 
October 2012; and 
• Phase ree – the beginning of the “transition” and the local implementation of the 
agreements (also known as the territorial peace-building stage). 
e second feature of the talks was that, against all odds, the government and FARC-EP’s 
agreed agenda was clear and concise: it comprised just six topics (viz. ve substantive topics 
and one procedural point on implementation, verication and endorsement). is evidenced 
the will of the parties to reach a concrete outcome in a relevant time-frame by engaging a 
nite number of issues. Limiting the agenda proved absolutely essential to organising the 
process in Havana. e xed agenda has been valuable above all for separating the 
often-technical talks from the more political deliberations taking place within the 
appropriate institutions of Colombian democracy. Of course all six issues are tightly related 
to matters o the negotiating table (e.g., agrarian policy, the transitional justice mechanisms 
for national military forces, the policy on the war on drugs), but the wording of the agenda 
has been the criteria separating the conversations taking place in Cuba and in Colombia.  
e third key feature of the peace process design is the operational rulebook included in the 
framework agenda. is regulates issues of condentiality; the interaction of the parties with 
the media during negotiations; the talks’ outreach strategy; the authorised number of 
delegates of each party; the creation of participation mechanisms for civil society; and many 
other procedural issues that, if not regulated, could easily derail or obstruct the negotiations. 
For example, Rule VI states, “A mechanism for jointly communicating progress made by the 
Table shall be set up. Discussions held at the Table shall not be made public and an ecient 
communications strategy shall be implemented”. 
e design and preparation of the Colombian peace process is setting a new standard for 
future peace talks around the world. e Colombian case has shown that a well thought-out 
process can prove an advantage for both parties. It gives hope that most crises are solvable on 
the basis of the rules and mechanisms established in a framework agenda, as these initial 
agreements give the whole subsequent negotiation stability by providing a common ground 
and a sense of predictability and common purpose.
VICTIM’S RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PARTICIPATION.
Victim’s rights and the question of how to deal with the legacy of the past have been neglected 
or poorly managed in many peace processes around the world, because of their complexity 
and sensitivity. Disputes over how to deal with the grievances of warring parties often prove 
to be a deal-breaker. Many negotiations have chosen to leave the issue of victim’s rights to 
future political debate, to avoid “contaminating” the process with “insoluble” issues that 
might derail it. is stems from a specious contradiction between justice and peace. Past trials 
at peace-making have given priority to reaching the peace agreement, regardless of justice, 
truth or reparations. Experience has exposed this approach as fundamentally awed, because 
postponing the demands of justice to future generations, and leaving unattended the seeds of 
potential conict, achieves only an unstable and short-lived peace. 
e Colombian peace process dees this approach. Both parties have agreed from the start 
that victims’ rights must be a distinct and central issue on the agenda. is acknowledgement 
responds to the sheer magnitude of human suering in the country: there are seven million 
victims of the various warring parties so far, 80% of whom are civilians. e government and 
FARC-EP recognised that an agreement that did not place victims’ rights at its core would be 
not only be unlawful, but also immoral, illegitimate and ephemeral. International law as it 
stands today provides for justice, truth and reparations to the victims of internationally 
recognised crimes. In acknowledgement of the value of the Colombian case, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is looking closely at it to understand how international criminal law 
Another key innovation of the Colombian peace process regarding international involvement 
is the participation role of international advisors. Both sides of the table have access to teams 
of international experts who can advise them on various matters, as provided by the 
framework agreement. is resource mechanism has been available in discussions on political 
participation and transitional justice, where international experience has proved invaluable. 
International input has played a positive role in bringing lessons and experiences learned 
from other peace processes around the world to bear on Colombia’s situation, and oering 
the parties a variety of solutions and ideas to the tactical and strategic dilemmas of the talks.
Another important feature of the peace process is the role played by the guarantor countries, 
Norway and Cuba, and by the observer countries, Chile and Venezuela. e guarantors’ role 
is to ensure that both parties abide by the agreed-upon rules, as trust can wane as negotiations 
wear on (Beittel 2013: 27). ere are also observers whose role is to clarify the disputed 
points in the case of a crisis that may lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations 
(Armengol 2013, 6). However, there is no appointed international mediator in the 
Colombian process (Gienger 2013). e role of these four countries has been key in settling 
disputes during negotiations; building trust between the parties; and solving the many 
day-to-day logistical issues.
Arranging a positive and supportive international context has been indispensable to the peace 
process because it helped shore up external legitimacy; gave much-needed access to lessons 
learnt in other countries; and served as an important indicator of progress for an 
often-incredulous public opinion at home. Negotiation of the topics in the framework 
agreement, especially those of illicit drugs and transitional justice, will have important 
international ramications. e international ambience set up before and kept in place during 
the process will certainly conduce to dealing with them in a constructive and positive way.  
PREPARATION, STRUCTURE AND DESIGN.
e Colombian peace talks are an example of preparing and designing a negotiation 
adequately to reach the desired endgame. During the exploratory talks, or what is commonly 
known in the literature as “talks about talks”, the parties agreed on three features that have 
proved crucial for the development of the public phase of the process. 
During conict, irregular armies, mainly FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas, waged war on the 
State and paramilitary forces throughout most of the country. e Colombian situation is 
one of the longest-running internal armed conicts in the world. As the following gures 
suggest, this devastating confrontation has been active for over ve decades and its magnitude 
was, and still is greater than many major inter-state wars in the world.
• As at the end of 2014, 38 million people around the world had been forced to ee their 
homes by armed conict. Colombia ranks second in the world according to the number of 
internally displaced people (IDP), with around 6 million IDPs, only surpassed by Syria with 
7.6 million. Iraq holds third place with 3.3 million. e IDP population of Colombia is 
equivalent to the whole population of Singapore or Denmark (IDMC, 2015).
• e Colombian government’s reparations programme set up in 2011 has so far registered 
7.7 million victims of displacement, murder, torture, sexual violence, disappearance and 
kidnapping, and other grave violations of human rights. is tally implies that almost 14% 
of the total population has suered directly from the conict and consider themselves victims 
(Colombia, Unidad de Victimas, 2015).
• Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of landmine victims; only Afghanistan and 
Cambodia have more victims of landmines (Colombia, PAICMA, 2015). 
• 220,000 killings have been registered during the conict, 80% of them civilians (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). is includes three Presidential candidates, one 
Attorney General, one Minister of Justice, 200 judges, 175 Mayors and sixteen Congressmen 
who were assassinated during the conict.
• Colombia has registered 100,000 victims of involuntary ‘disappearance’, a sum equal to all 
reported cases under the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile and Brazil combined (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). 
• 3,000 militants of a single political party, the Unión Patriótica, were killed in a period of ten 
years during the internal war (Dudley, 2006).  
• e authorities have registered 39,058 kidnappings in the period between 1970 and 2010. 
is implies that, during that period, one person was abducted every 12 hours for political or 
economic ends (Colombia, Centro de Memoria Historica, Informe Secuestro 2013). 
• Governmental authorities and non-governmental organisations together have registered 
about 5,000 extrajudicial killings carried out by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.
An important feature of the Colombian peace process is that it has been exclusively led by the 
national government (Haspeslagh, 2015); while at the same time interactively engaging third 
parties and the international community as a whole. e role played by diplomacy partially 
explains why the peace eort is moving forward and achieving success; the international 
community as a whole and many leading states, which have become part of the process, have 
been a key to progress. 
From the beginning of his term in 2010, President Santos recognised that Colombia had to 
reboot its foreign policy and rebuild diplomatic ties with the world at large and with the 
Latin American region, especially its close neighbours Venezuela and Ecuador. e 
government of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) had escalated confrontations with other states in 
the region, accusing them of harbouring and supporting “terrorists”. At the global level, the 
international community had mistrusted the Colombian government because of its poor 
record on human rights, corruption, and for some, for its alignment with the Bush 
Administration during the rst years of the “war on terror”.  In early 2010 the international 
context was not appropriate to start negotiations to end one of the longest conicts of the 
Western Hemisphere, one heavily inuenced by the international drug trade, and one in 
which FARC-EP, the Colombian military forces, and various the paramilitaries were all 
involved in war international crimes. 
President Juan Manuel Santos and his Ministers knew that if a peace agreement were reached, 
the outcome would impact many foreign political agendas, such as US relations with Cuba 
and Venezuela, the limits of international criminal law, and the global debate over the war on 
drugs, among others. is is why Santos has been active and very successful in changing the 
negative trend inherited from the past. All nations in South America now fully support the 
Colombian peace process, and many countries around the world are ready to contribute to 
the implementation and verication of the nal agreements on matters ranging from 
investment in rural infrastructure, to reintegration of ex-combatants, to victims’ rights. 
Diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador were rebuilt and trust restored to the point 
that Venezuela could be accepted as a sponsor of the peace talks. Colombian diplomacy was 
strategic enough to enlist and appoint Cuba as the host country and guarantor of the process, 
alongside Norway, while keeping the US on board. So far, the USA, UNASUR, the European 
Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations have appointed special envoys to the 
process, which suggests a growing interest in the outcome and a commitment to addressing 
the challenges thereof. For example, when US Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Bernie 
Aronson the US Special Envoy, he stated: 
After a long year of negotiations on the topic of victims’ rights and transitional justice, the 
parties agreed three key elements of a broader transitional justice regime. In June 2015 they 
agreed the creation of a Truth Commission. On the 23rd of September 2015 the President of 
Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, and the FARC-EP’s Timochenko announced an agreement 
to create a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a mechanism to investigate, prosecute and punish 
international crimes. Finally, on the 18th of October 2015, the delegations announced an 
agreement to create a specialised unit (in addition to the CBM mentioned above) to search 
for people who disappeared as a result of the conict, which will start operations after the 
peace agreement, is signed.
Victims’ participation has been essential to the delegations’ work and to the peace process as 
a whole. e views expressed by victims are currently informing many agreements on the 
topic. Putting victims’ rights at the centre of the peace process has been one of the main 
contributions of the Colombian peace process.
CONCLUSION.
According to many experts, Colombia is currently the main peace process in the world and a 
cynosure of international peace-building. e Colombian case is proof that protracted 
internal armed conict can be addressed through dialogue (Herbolzheimer, 2014). I have 
discussed three main contributions that have emerging from the Colombian process: (i) a role 
for active diplomacy to enable a respectful international engagement, while at the same time 
conserving national ownership of the process; (ii) a robust strategic plan that observes the 
dierence between negotiating the end of the conict and building peace, between peace 
talks and the peace process; (iii) the commitment to victims’ rights, which has led to a 
national and global debate over the possibilities and limits of applying international criminal 
law in the context of peace negotiations, and the meaning of reconciliation. Colombia is a 
timely reference for a global community standing at the crossroads of ways to address 
complex violence in the age of accountability. 
e treatment given to diplomacy, the importance of contextual preparation and design, and 
the inclusion of victims’ rights as a central issue all evidence that Colombia’s peace process is 
setting new standards in many elds and is becoming an exemplar for peace endeavours 
around the world. Colombia is developing a new model that other countries, especially in the 
Global South, can adopt to satisfy the increasing global demands for accountability, while 
also helping those in conict to achieve a stable and lasting peace.
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might be harmonised with the right of states to pursue peace for their peoples and future 
generations. Currently, both parties are aiming for a peace deal that looks to the future but 
also recognises and acknowledges what happened in the past. ere is a common 
understanding that in order to initiate the peace-building phase, not only the parties to the 
conict but also the whole population must face the past in a constructive, reective and 
comprehensive way. 
To carry out the principle of prioritising victim’s rights, the parties have created three 
mechanisms to empower victims to take their rightful place in the talks. e Colombian 
peace process is a world-class example of how victims can participate directly in peace talks. 
In past peace processes around the world, victims and their organisations only had a chance 
to be involved after an agreement was reached, either participating in truth commissions or 
in trials against perpetrators. In the Colombian process, victims have been actively 
participating from the outset. 
e rst mechanism created was a direct channel, via electronic or conventional mail, for 
sending proposals to both delegations, so that victims could directly contribute to the drafting 
of the agreements. To date, the government and FARC-EP have received 24,475 proposals 
regarding victims’ rights issues (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e second mechanism was participation in several events in Colombia expressly created for 
victims to impact the negotiations in Cuba. e delegations appointed a collegiate third 
party, composed of the United Nations, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and the 
Catholic Church, to organise regional events where victims from all over the country could 
deliver their views, expectations and proposals. ese events where attended by 3,162 victims 
and 4,617 victims’ organisations, from whom the parties received an additional 22,146 
proposals (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e third mechanism consisted of public hearings in Havana, where victims were invited to 
engage directly with both delegations. e sessions took place before and during the 
discussion of victims’ rights and transitional justice with the aim of hearing victims in person 
tell of their expectations and demands, in hopes that this would enlighten the talks while they 
were still on going. In ve hearings, sixty victims from dierent regions, who had suered 
diverse violations of their rights at the hands of many armed actors, were able to confront the 
delegations and by their narratives convey their suering, expectations and needs. is 
unprecedented mechanism was pivotal for starting the dicult negotiations about how to 
deal with the past in Colombia.
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First, the government and FARC-EP agreed that the goal of the negotiation was simply to put 
an end to armed conict, rather than to “make peace” in any positive sense. is may sound 
obvious, but it is essential to manage internal and external expectations of what a process can 
achieve. In past attempts, Colombia governments “sold” peace talks to the public as a 
panacea, promising that the peace agreement would instantly bring about development and 
other benets besides the silencing of guns. is proved to be a mistake insofar as adversarial 
parties could simply not deliver on this process, damaging the government’s popularity and 
credibility and defrauding the public’s expectations. By contrast, the government’s simple 
agreement with FARC-EP to limit the desired outcome proved a powerful focal point, such 
that from the outset the political will existed to seek common ground. e framework sets an 
agenda with the clear objective of ending political violence in order to give way to a 
peace-building phase, namely where the agreements will be implemented with the 
participation of the whole population on their own territories. e framework agenda, agreed 
in the secret phase of the talks, was designed to include only the topics necessary to guarantee 
an end to armed conict and to lay the basis for a separate peace-building phase. e six 
topics mentioned above were chosen because both sides agreed that putting these reforms and 
mechanisms in place would end political violence and allow peace to ourish in Colombia. 
e parties agreed not only on the desired outcome, but also on a shared vision of the 
sequencing of the process: 
• Phase One – the exploratory secret talks, which lasted around six months; 
• Phase Two – the public talks, which were announced at a public event in Oslo, Norway in 
October 2012; and 
• Phase ree – the beginning of the “transition” and the local implementation of the 
agreements (also known as the territorial peace-building stage). 
e second feature of the talks was that, against all odds, the government and FARC-EP’s 
agreed agenda was clear and concise: it comprised just six topics (viz. ve substantive topics 
and one procedural point on implementation, verication and endorsement). is evidenced 
the will of the parties to reach a concrete outcome in a relevant time-frame by engaging a 
nite number of issues. Limiting the agenda proved absolutely essential to organising the 
process in Havana. e xed agenda has been valuable above all for separating the 
often-technical talks from the more political deliberations taking place within the 
appropriate institutions of Colombian democracy. Of course all six issues are tightly related 
to matters o the negotiating table (e.g., agrarian policy, the transitional justice mechanisms 
for national military forces, the policy on the war on drugs), but the wording of the agenda 
has been the criteria separating the conversations taking place in Cuba and in Colombia.  
e third key feature of the peace process design is the operational rulebook included in the 
framework agenda. is regulates issues of condentiality; the interaction of the parties with 
the media during negotiations; the talks’ outreach strategy; the authorised number of 
delegates of each party; the creation of participation mechanisms for civil society; and many 
other procedural issues that, if not regulated, could easily derail or obstruct the negotiations. 
For example, Rule VI states, “A mechanism for jointly communicating progress made by the 
Table shall be set up. Discussions held at the Table shall not be made public and an ecient 
communications strategy shall be implemented”. 
e design and preparation of the Colombian peace process is setting a new standard for 
future peace talks around the world. e Colombian case has shown that a well thought-out 
process can prove an advantage for both parties. It gives hope that most crises are solvable on 
the basis of the rules and mechanisms established in a framework agenda, as these initial 
agreements give the whole subsequent negotiation stability by providing a common ground 
and a sense of predictability and common purpose.
VICTIM’S RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PARTICIPATION.
Victim’s rights and the question of how to deal with the legacy of the past have been neglected 
or poorly managed in many peace processes around the world, because of their complexity 
and sensitivity. Disputes over how to deal with the grievances of warring parties often prove 
to be a deal-breaker. Many negotiations have chosen to leave the issue of victim’s rights to 
future political debate, to avoid “contaminating” the process with “insoluble” issues that 
might derail it. is stems from a specious contradiction between justice and peace. Past trials 
at peace-making have given priority to reaching the peace agreement, regardless of justice, 
truth or reparations. Experience has exposed this approach as fundamentally awed, because 
postponing the demands of justice to future generations, and leaving unattended the seeds of 
potential conict, achieves only an unstable and short-lived peace. 
e Colombian peace process dees this approach. Both parties have agreed from the start 
that victims’ rights must be a distinct and central issue on the agenda. is acknowledgement 
responds to the sheer magnitude of human suering in the country: there are seven million 
victims of the various warring parties so far, 80% of whom are civilians. e government and 
FARC-EP recognised that an agreement that did not place victims’ rights at its core would be 
not only be unlawful, but also immoral, illegitimate and ephemeral. International law as it 
stands today provides for justice, truth and reparations to the victims of internationally 
recognised crimes. In acknowledgement of the value of the Colombian case, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is looking closely at it to understand how international criminal law 
Another key innovation of the Colombian peace process regarding international involvement 
is the participation role of international advisors. Both sides of the table have access to teams 
of international experts who can advise them on various matters, as provided by the 
framework agreement. is resource mechanism has been available in discussions on political 
participation and transitional justice, where international experience has proved invaluable. 
International input has played a positive role in bringing lessons and experiences learned 
from other peace processes around the world to bear on Colombia’s situation, and oering 
the parties a variety of solutions and ideas to the tactical and strategic dilemmas of the talks.
Another important feature of the peace process is the role played by the guarantor countries, 
Norway and Cuba, and by the observer countries, Chile and Venezuela. e guarantors’ role 
is to ensure that both parties abide by the agreed-upon rules, as trust can wane as negotiations 
wear on (Beittel 2013: 27). ere are also observers whose role is to clarify the disputed 
points in the case of a crisis that may lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations 
(Armengol 2013, 6). However, there is no appointed international mediator in the 
Colombian process (Gienger 2013). e role of these four countries has been key in settling 
disputes during negotiations; building trust between the parties; and solving the many 
day-to-day logistical issues.
Arranging a positive and supportive international context has been indispensable to the peace 
process because it helped shore up external legitimacy; gave much-needed access to lessons 
learnt in other countries; and served as an important indicator of progress for an 
often-incredulous public opinion at home. Negotiation of the topics in the framework 
agreement, especially those of illicit drugs and transitional justice, will have important 
international ramications. e international ambience set up before and kept in place during 
the process will certainly conduce to dealing with them in a constructive and positive way.  
PREPARATION, STRUCTURE AND DESIGN.
e Colombian peace talks are an example of preparing and designing a negotiation 
adequately to reach the desired endgame. During the exploratory talks, or what is commonly 
known in the literature as “talks about talks”, the parties agreed on three features that have 
proved crucial for the development of the public phase of the process. 
During conict, irregular armies, mainly FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas, waged war on the 
State and paramilitary forces throughout most of the country. e Colombian situation is 
one of the longest-running internal armed conicts in the world. As the following gures 
suggest, this devastating confrontation has been active for over ve decades and its magnitude 
was, and still is greater than many major inter-state wars in the world.
• As at the end of 2014, 38 million people around the world had been forced to ee their 
homes by armed conict. Colombia ranks second in the world according to the number of 
internally displaced people (IDP), with around 6 million IDPs, only surpassed by Syria with 
7.6 million. Iraq holds third place with 3.3 million. e IDP population of Colombia is 
equivalent to the whole population of Singapore or Denmark (IDMC, 2015).
• e Colombian government’s reparations programme set up in 2011 has so far registered 
7.7 million victims of displacement, murder, torture, sexual violence, disappearance and 
kidnapping, and other grave violations of human rights. is tally implies that almost 14% 
of the total population has suered directly from the conict and consider themselves victims 
(Colombia, Unidad de Victimas, 2015).
• Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of landmine victims; only Afghanistan and 
Cambodia have more victims of landmines (Colombia, PAICMA, 2015). 
• 220,000 killings have been registered during the conict, 80% of them civilians (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). is includes three Presidential candidates, one 
Attorney General, one Minister of Justice, 200 judges, 175 Mayors and sixteen Congressmen 
who were assassinated during the conict.
• Colombia has registered 100,000 victims of involuntary ‘disappearance’, a sum equal to all 
reported cases under the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile and Brazil combined (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). 
• 3,000 militants of a single political party, the Unión Patriótica, were killed in a period of ten 
years during the internal war (Dudley, 2006).  
• e authorities have registered 39,058 kidnappings in the period between 1970 and 2010. 
is implies that, during that period, one person was abducted every 12 hours for political or 
economic ends (Colombia, Centro de Memoria Historica, Informe Secuestro 2013). 
• Governmental authorities and non-governmental organisations together have registered 
about 5,000 extrajudicial killings carried out by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.
An important feature of the Colombian peace process is that it has been exclusively led by the 
national government (Haspeslagh, 2015); while at the same time interactively engaging third 
parties and the international community as a whole. e role played by diplomacy partially 
explains why the peace eort is moving forward and achieving success; the international 
community as a whole and many leading states, which have become part of the process, have 
been a key to progress. 
From the beginning of his term in 2010, President Santos recognised that Colombia had to 
reboot its foreign policy and rebuild diplomatic ties with the world at large and with the 
Latin American region, especially its close neighbours Venezuela and Ecuador. e 
government of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) had escalated confrontations with other states in 
the region, accusing them of harbouring and supporting “terrorists”. At the global level, the 
international community had mistrusted the Colombian government because of its poor 
record on human rights, corruption, and for some, for its alignment with the Bush 
Administration during the rst years of the “war on terror”.  In early 2010 the international 
context was not appropriate to start negotiations to end one of the longest conicts of the 
Western Hemisphere, one heavily inuenced by the international drug trade, and one in 
which FARC-EP, the Colombian military forces, and various the paramilitaries were all 
involved in war international crimes. 
President Juan Manuel Santos and his Ministers knew that if a peace agreement were reached, 
the outcome would impact many foreign political agendas, such as US relations with Cuba 
and Venezuela, the limits of international criminal law, and the global debate over the war on 
drugs, among others. is is why Santos has been active and very successful in changing the 
negative trend inherited from the past. All nations in South America now fully support the 
Colombian peace process, and many countries around the world are ready to contribute to 
the implementation and verication of the nal agreements on matters ranging from 
investment in rural infrastructure, to reintegration of ex-combatants, to victims’ rights. 
Diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador were rebuilt and trust restored to the point 
that Venezuela could be accepted as a sponsor of the peace talks. Colombian diplomacy was 
strategic enough to enlist and appoint Cuba as the host country and guarantor of the process, 
alongside Norway, while keeping the US on board. So far, the USA, UNASUR, the European 
Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations have appointed special envoys to the 
process, which suggests a growing interest in the outcome and a commitment to addressing 
the challenges thereof. For example, when US Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Bernie 
Aronson the US Special Envoy, he stated: 
After a long year of negotiations on the topic of victims’ rights and transitional justice, the 
parties agreed three key elements of a broader transitional justice regime. In June 2015 they 
agreed the creation of a Truth Commission. On the 23rd of September 2015 the President of 
Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, and the FARC-EP’s Timochenko announced an agreement 
to create a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a mechanism to investigate, prosecute and punish 
international crimes. Finally, on the 18th of October 2015, the delegations announced an 
agreement to create a specialised unit (in addition to the CBM mentioned above) to search 
for people who disappeared as a result of the conict, which will start operations after the 
peace agreement, is signed.
Victims’ participation has been essential to the delegations’ work and to the peace process as 
a whole. e views expressed by victims are currently informing many agreements on the 
topic. Putting victims’ rights at the centre of the peace process has been one of the main 
contributions of the Colombian peace process.
CONCLUSION.
According to many experts, Colombia is currently the main peace process in the world and a 
cynosure of international peace-building. e Colombian case is proof that protracted 
internal armed conict can be addressed through dialogue (Herbolzheimer, 2014). I have 
discussed three main contributions that have emerging from the Colombian process: (i) a role 
for active diplomacy to enable a respectful international engagement, while at the same time 
conserving national ownership of the process; (ii) a robust strategic plan that observes the 
dierence between negotiating the end of the conict and building peace, between peace 
talks and the peace process; (iii) the commitment to victims’ rights, which has led to a 
national and global debate over the possibilities and limits of applying international criminal 
law in the context of peace negotiations, and the meaning of reconciliation. Colombia is a 
timely reference for a global community standing at the crossroads of ways to address 
complex violence in the age of accountability. 
e treatment given to diplomacy, the importance of contextual preparation and design, and 
the inclusion of victims’ rights as a central issue all evidence that Colombia’s peace process is 
setting new standards in many elds and is becoming an exemplar for peace endeavours 
around the world. Colombia is developing a new model that other countries, especially in the 
Global South, can adopt to satisfy the increasing global demands for accountability, while 
also helping those in conict to achieve a stable and lasting peace.
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might be harmonised with the right of states to pursue peace for their peoples and future 
generations. Currently, both parties are aiming for a peace deal that looks to the future but 
also recognises and acknowledges what happened in the past. ere is a common 
understanding that in order to initiate the peace-building phase, not only the parties to the 
conict but also the whole population must face the past in a constructive, reective and 
comprehensive way. 
To carry out the principle of prioritising victim’s rights, the parties have created three 
mechanisms to empower victims to take their rightful place in the talks. e Colombian 
peace process is a world-class example of how victims can participate directly in peace talks. 
In past peace processes around the world, victims and their organisations only had a chance 
to be involved after an agreement was reached, either participating in truth commissions or 
in trials against perpetrators. In the Colombian process, victims have been actively 
participating from the outset. 
e rst mechanism created was a direct channel, via electronic or conventional mail, for 
sending proposals to both delegations, so that victims could directly contribute to the drafting 
of the agreements. To date, the government and FARC-EP have received 24,475 proposals 
regarding victims’ rights issues (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e second mechanism was participation in several events in Colombia expressly created for 
victims to impact the negotiations in Cuba. e delegations appointed a collegiate third 
party, composed of the United Nations, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and the 
Catholic Church, to organise regional events where victims from all over the country could 
deliver their views, expectations and proposals. ese events where attended by 3,162 victims 
and 4,617 victims’ organisations, from whom the parties received an additional 22,146 
proposals (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e third mechanism consisted of public hearings in Havana, where victims were invited to 
engage directly with both delegations. e sessions took place before and during the 
discussion of victims’ rights and transitional justice with the aim of hearing victims in person 
tell of their expectations and demands, in hopes that this would enlighten the talks while they 
were still on going. In ve hearings, sixty victims from dierent regions, who had suered 
diverse violations of their rights at the hands of many armed actors, were able to confront the 
delegations and by their narratives convey their suering, expectations and needs. is 
unprecedented mechanism was pivotal for starting the dicult negotiations about how to 
deal with the past in Colombia.
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First, the government and FARC-EP agreed that the goal of the negotiation was simply to put 
an end to armed conict, rather than to “make peace” in any positive sense. is may sound 
obvious, but it is essential to manage internal and external expectations of what a process can 
achieve. In past attempts, Colombia governments “sold” peace talks to the public as a 
panacea, promising that the peace agreement would instantly bring about development and 
other benets besides the silencing of guns. is proved to be a mistake insofar as adversarial 
parties could simply not deliver on this process, damaging the government’s popularity and 
credibility and defrauding the public’s expectations. By contrast, the government’s simple 
agreement with FARC-EP to limit the desired outcome proved a powerful focal point, such 
that from the outset the political will existed to seek common ground. e framework sets an 
agenda with the clear objective of ending political violence in order to give way to a 
peace-building phase, namely where the agreements will be implemented with the 
participation of the whole population on their own territories. e framework agenda, agreed 
in the secret phase of the talks, was designed to include only the topics necessary to guarantee 
an end to armed conict and to lay the basis for a separate peace-building phase. e six 
topics mentioned above were chosen because both sides agreed that putting these reforms and 
mechanisms in place would end political violence and allow peace to ourish in Colombia. 
e parties agreed not only on the desired outcome, but also on a shared vision of the 
sequencing of the process: 
• Phase One – the exploratory secret talks, which lasted around six months; 
• Phase Two – the public talks, which were announced at a public event in Oslo, Norway in 
October 2012; and 
• Phase ree – the beginning of the “transition” and the local implementation of the 
agreements (also known as the territorial peace-building stage). 
e second feature of the talks was that, against all odds, the government and FARC-EP’s 
agreed agenda was clear and concise: it comprised just six topics (viz. ve substantive topics 
and one procedural point on implementation, verication and endorsement). is evidenced 
the will of the parties to reach a concrete outcome in a relevant time-frame by engaging a 
nite number of issues. Limiting the agenda proved absolutely essential to organising the 
process in Havana. e xed agenda has been valuable above all for separating the 
often-technical talks from the more political deliberations taking place within the 
appropriate institutions of Colombian democracy. Of course all six issues are tightly related 
to matters o the negotiating table (e.g., agrarian policy, the transitional justice mechanisms 
for national military forces, the policy on the war on drugs), but the wording of the agenda 
has been the criteria separating the conversations taking place in Cuba and in Colombia.  
e third key feature of the peace process design is the operational rulebook included in the 
framework agenda. is regulates issues of condentiality; the interaction of the parties with 
the media during negotiations; the talks’ outreach strategy; the authorised number of 
delegates of each party; the creation of participation mechanisms for civil society; and many 
other procedural issues that, if not regulated, could easily derail or obstruct the negotiations. 
For example, Rule VI states, “A mechanism for jointly communicating progress made by the 
Table shall be set up. Discussions held at the Table shall not be made public and an ecient 
communications strategy shall be implemented”. 
e design and preparation of the Colombian peace process is setting a new standard for 
future peace talks around the world. e Colombian case has shown that a well thought-out 
process can prove an advantage for both parties. It gives hope that most crises are solvable on 
the basis of the rules and mechanisms established in a framework agenda, as these initial 
agreements give the whole subsequent negotiation stability by providing a common ground 
and a sense of predictability and common purpose.
VICTIM’S RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PARTICIPATION.
Victim’s rights and the question of how to deal with the legacy of the past have been neglected 
or poorly managed in many peace processes around the world, because of their complexity 
and sensitivity. Disputes over how to deal with the grievances of warring parties often prove 
to be a deal-breaker. Many negotiations have chosen to leave the issue of victim’s rights to 
future political debate, to avoid “contaminating” the process with “insoluble” issues that 
might derail it. is stems from a specious contradiction between justice and peace. Past trials 
at peace-making have given priority to reaching the peace agreement, regardless of justice, 
truth or reparations. Experience has exposed this approach as fundamentally awed, because 
postponing the demands of justice to future generations, and leaving unattended the seeds of 
potential conict, achieves only an unstable and short-lived peace. 
e Colombian peace process dees this approach. Both parties have agreed from the start 
that victims’ rights must be a distinct and central issue on the agenda. is acknowledgement 
responds to the sheer magnitude of human suering in the country: there are seven million 
victims of the various warring parties so far, 80% of whom are civilians. e government and 
FARC-EP recognised that an agreement that did not place victims’ rights at its core would be 
not only be unlawful, but also immoral, illegitimate and ephemeral. International law as it 
stands today provides for justice, truth and reparations to the victims of internationally 
recognised crimes. In acknowledgement of the value of the Colombian case, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is looking closely at it to understand how international criminal law 
Another key innovation of the Colombian peace process regarding international involvement 
is the participation role of international advisors. Both sides of the table have access to teams 
of international experts who can advise them on various matters, as provided by the 
framework agreement. is resource mechanism has been available in discussions on political 
participation and transitional justice, where international experience has proved invaluable. 
International input has played a positive role in bringing lessons and experiences learned 
from other peace processes around the world to bear on Colombia’s situation, and oering 
the parties a variety of solutions and ideas to the tactical and strategic dilemmas of the talks.
Another important feature of the peace process is the role played by the guarantor countries, 
Norway and Cuba, and by the observer countries, Chile and Venezuela. e guarantors’ role 
is to ensure that both parties abide by the agreed-upon rules, as trust can wane as negotiations 
wear on (Beittel 2013: 27). ere are also observers whose role is to clarify the disputed 
points in the case of a crisis that may lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations 
(Armengol 2013, 6). However, there is no appointed international mediator in the 
Colombian process (Gienger 2013). e role of these four countries has been key in settling 
disputes during negotiations; building trust between the parties; and solving the many 
day-to-day logistical issues.
Arranging a positive and supportive international context has been indispensable to the peace 
process because it helped shore up external legitimacy; gave much-needed access to lessons 
learnt in other countries; and served as an important indicator of progress for an 
often-incredulous public opinion at home. Negotiation of the topics in the framework 
agreement, especially those of illicit drugs and transitional justice, will have important 
international ramications. e international ambience set up before and kept in place during 
the process will certainly conduce to dealing with them in a constructive and positive way.  
PREPARATION, STRUCTURE AND DESIGN.
e Colombian peace talks are an example of preparing and designing a negotiation 
adequately to reach the desired endgame. During the exploratory talks, or what is commonly 
known in the literature as “talks about talks”, the parties agreed on three features that have 
proved crucial for the development of the public phase of the process. 
During conict, irregular armies, mainly FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas, waged war on the 
State and paramilitary forces throughout most of the country. e Colombian situation is 
one of the longest-running internal armed conicts in the world. As the following gures 
suggest, this devastating confrontation has been active for over ve decades and its magnitude 
was, and still is greater than many major inter-state wars in the world.
• As at the end of 2014, 38 million people around the world had been forced to ee their 
homes by armed conict. Colombia ranks second in the world according to the number of 
internally displaced people (IDP), with around 6 million IDPs, only surpassed by Syria with 
7.6 million. Iraq holds third place with 3.3 million. e IDP population of Colombia is 
equivalent to the whole population of Singapore or Denmark (IDMC, 2015).
• e Colombian government’s reparations programme set up in 2011 has so far registered 
7.7 million victims of displacement, murder, torture, sexual violence, disappearance and 
kidnapping, and other grave violations of human rights. is tally implies that almost 14% 
of the total population has suered directly from the conict and consider themselves victims 
(Colombia, Unidad de Victimas, 2015).
• Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of landmine victims; only Afghanistan and 
Cambodia have more victims of landmines (Colombia, PAICMA, 2015). 
• 220,000 killings have been registered during the conict, 80% of them civilians (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). is includes three Presidential candidates, one 
Attorney General, one Minister of Justice, 200 judges, 175 Mayors and sixteen Congressmen 
who were assassinated during the conict.
• Colombia has registered 100,000 victims of involuntary ‘disappearance’, a sum equal to all 
reported cases under the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile and Brazil combined (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). 
• 3,000 militants of a single political party, the Unión Patriótica, were killed in a period of ten 
years during the internal war (Dudley, 2006).  
• e authorities have registered 39,058 kidnappings in the period between 1970 and 2010. 
is implies that, during that period, one person was abducted every 12 hours for political or 
economic ends (Colombia, Centro de Memoria Historica, Informe Secuestro 2013). 
• Governmental authorities and non-governmental organisations together have registered 
about 5,000 extrajudicial killings carried out by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.
An important feature of the Colombian peace process is that it has been exclusively led by the 
national government (Haspeslagh, 2015); while at the same time interactively engaging third 
parties and the international community as a whole. e role played by diplomacy partially 
explains why the peace eort is moving forward and achieving success; the international 
community as a whole and many leading states, which have become part of the process, have 
been a key to progress. 
From the beginning of his term in 2010, President Santos recognised that Colombia had to 
reboot its foreign policy and rebuild diplomatic ties with the world at large and with the 
Latin American region, especially its close neighbours Venezuela and Ecuador. e 
government of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) had escalated confrontations with other states in 
the region, accusing them of harbouring and supporting “terrorists”. At the global level, the 
international community had mistrusted the Colombian government because of its poor 
record on human rights, corruption, and for some, for its alignment with the Bush 
Administration during the rst years of the “war on terror”.  In early 2010 the international 
context was not appropriate to start negotiations to end one of the longest conicts of the 
Western Hemisphere, one heavily inuenced by the international drug trade, and one in 
which FARC-EP, the Colombian military forces, and various the paramilitaries were all 
involved in war international crimes. 
President Juan Manuel Santos and his Ministers knew that if a peace agreement were reached, 
the outcome would impact many foreign political agendas, such as US relations with Cuba 
and Venezuela, the limits of international criminal law, and the global debate over the war on 
drugs, among others. is is why Santos has been active and very successful in changing the 
negative trend inherited from the past. All nations in South America now fully support the 
Colombian peace process, and many countries around the world are ready to contribute to 
the implementation and verication of the nal agreements on matters ranging from 
investment in rural infrastructure, to reintegration of ex-combatants, to victims’ rights. 
Diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador were rebuilt and trust restored to the point 
that Venezuela could be accepted as a sponsor of the peace talks. Colombian diplomacy was 
strategic enough to enlist and appoint Cuba as the host country and guarantor of the process, 
alongside Norway, while keeping the US on board. So far, the USA, UNASUR, the European 
Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations have appointed special envoys to the 
process, which suggests a growing interest in the outcome and a commitment to addressing 
the challenges thereof. For example, when US Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Bernie 
Aronson the US Special Envoy, he stated: 
After a long year of negotiations on the topic of victims’ rights and transitional justice, the 
parties agreed three key elements of a broader transitional justice regime. In June 2015 they 
agreed the creation of a Truth Commission. On the 23rd of September 2015 the President of 
Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, and the FARC-EP’s Timochenko announced an agreement 
to create a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a mechanism to investigate, prosecute and punish 
international crimes. Finally, on the 18th of October 2015, the delegations announced an 
agreement to create a specialised unit (in addition to the CBM mentioned above) to search 
for people who disappeared as a result of the conict, which will start operations after the 
peace agreement, is signed.
Victims’ participation has been essential to the delegations’ work and to the peace process as 
a whole. e views expressed by victims are currently informing many agreements on the 
topic. Putting victims’ rights at the centre of the peace process has been one of the main 
contributions of the Colombian peace process.
CONCLUSION.
According to many experts, Colombia is currently the main peace process in the world and a 
cynosure of international peace-building. e Colombian case is proof that protracted 
internal armed conict can be addressed through dialogue (Herbolzheimer, 2014). I have 
discussed three main contributions that have emerging from the Colombian process: (i) a role 
for active diplomacy to enable a respectful international engagement, while at the same time 
conserving national ownership of the process; (ii) a robust strategic plan that observes the 
dierence between negotiating the end of the conict and building peace, between peace 
talks and the peace process; (iii) the commitment to victims’ rights, which has led to a 
national and global debate over the possibilities and limits of applying international criminal 
law in the context of peace negotiations, and the meaning of reconciliation. Colombia is a 
timely reference for a global community standing at the crossroads of ways to address 
complex violence in the age of accountability. 
e treatment given to diplomacy, the importance of contextual preparation and design, and 
the inclusion of victims’ rights as a central issue all evidence that Colombia’s peace process is 
setting new standards in many elds and is becoming an exemplar for peace endeavours 
around the world. Colombia is developing a new model that other countries, especially in the 
Global South, can adopt to satisfy the increasing global demands for accountability, while 
also helping those in conict to achieve a stable and lasting peace.
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might be harmonised with the right of states to pursue peace for their peoples and future 
generations. Currently, both parties are aiming for a peace deal that looks to the future but 
also recognises and acknowledges what happened in the past. ere is a common 
understanding that in order to initiate the peace-building phase, not only the parties to the 
conict but also the whole population must face the past in a constructive, reective and 
comprehensive way. 
To carry out the principle of prioritising victim’s rights, the parties have created three 
mechanisms to empower victims to take their rightful place in the talks. e Colombian 
peace process is a world-class example of how victims can participate directly in peace talks. 
In past peace processes around the world, victims and their organisations only had a chance 
to be involved after an agreement was reached, either participating in truth commissions or 
in trials against perpetrators. In the Colombian process, victims have been actively 
participating from the outset. 
e rst mechanism created was a direct channel, via electronic or conventional mail, for 
sending proposals to both delegations, so that victims could directly contribute to the drafting 
of the agreements. To date, the government and FARC-EP have received 24,475 proposals 
regarding victims’ rights issues (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e second mechanism was participation in several events in Colombia expressly created for 
victims to impact the negotiations in Cuba. e delegations appointed a collegiate third 
party, composed of the United Nations, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and the 
Catholic Church, to organise regional events where victims from all over the country could 
deliver their views, expectations and proposals. ese events where attended by 3,162 victims 
and 4,617 victims’ organisations, from whom the parties received an additional 22,146 
proposals (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e third mechanism consisted of public hearings in Havana, where victims were invited to 
engage directly with both delegations. e sessions took place before and during the 
discussion of victims’ rights and transitional justice with the aim of hearing victims in person 
tell of their expectations and demands, in hopes that this would enlighten the talks while they 
were still on going. In ve hearings, sixty victims from dierent regions, who had suered 
diverse violations of their rights at the hands of many armed actors, were able to confront the 
delegations and by their narratives convey their suering, expectations and needs. is 
unprecedented mechanism was pivotal for starting the dicult negotiations about how to 
deal with the past in Colombia.
First, the government and FARC-EP agreed that the goal of the negotiation was simply to put 
an end to armed conict, rather than to “make peace” in any positive sense. is may sound 
obvious, but it is essential to manage internal and external expectations of what a process can 
achieve. In past attempts, Colombia governments “sold” peace talks to the public as a 
panacea, promising that the peace agreement would instantly bring about development and 
other benets besides the silencing of guns. is proved to be a mistake insofar as adversarial 
parties could simply not deliver on this process, damaging the government’s popularity and 
credibility and defrauding the public’s expectations. By contrast, the government’s simple 
agreement with FARC-EP to limit the desired outcome proved a powerful focal point, such 
that from the outset the political will existed to seek common ground. e framework sets an 
agenda with the clear objective of ending political violence in order to give way to a 
peace-building phase, namely where the agreements will be implemented with the 
participation of the whole population on their own territories. e framework agenda, agreed 
in the secret phase of the talks, was designed to include only the topics necessary to guarantee 
an end to armed conict and to lay the basis for a separate peace-building phase. e six 
topics mentioned above were chosen because both sides agreed that putting these reforms and 
mechanisms in place would end political violence and allow peace to ourish in Colombia. 
e parties agreed not only on the desired outcome, but also on a shared vision of the 
sequencing of the process: 
• Phase One – the exploratory secret talks, which lasted around six months; 
• Phase Two – the public talks, which were announced at a public event in Oslo, Norway in 
October 2012; and 
• Phase ree – the beginning of the “transition” and the local implementation of the 
agreements (also known as the territorial peace-building stage). 
e second feature of the talks was that, against all odds, the government and FARC-EP’s 
agreed agenda was clear and concise: it comprised just six topics (viz. ve substantive topics 
and one procedural point on implementation, verication and endorsement). is evidenced 
the will of the parties to reach a concrete outcome in a relevant time-frame by engaging a 
nite number of issues. Limiting the agenda proved absolutely essential to organising the 
process in Havana. e xed agenda has been valuable above all for separating the 
often-technical talks from the more political deliberations taking place within the 
appropriate institutions of Colombian democracy. Of course all six issues are tightly related 
to matters o the negotiating table (e.g., agrarian policy, the transitional justice mechanisms 
for national military forces, the policy on the war on drugs), but the wording of the agenda 
has been the criteria separating the conversations taking place in Cuba and in Colombia.  
e third key feature of the peace process design is the operational rulebook included in the 
framework agenda. is regulates issues of condentiality; the interaction of the parties with 
the media during negotiations; the talks’ outreach strategy; the authorised number of 
delegates of each party; the creation of participation mechanisms for civil society; and many 
other procedural issues that, if not regulated, could easily derail or obstruct the negotiations. 
For example, Rule VI states, “A mechanism for jointly communicating progress made by the 
Table shall be set up. Discussions held at the Table shall not be made public and an ecient 
communications strategy shall be implemented”. 
e design and preparation of the Colombian peace process is setting a new standard for 
future peace talks around the world. e Colombian case has shown that a well thought-out 
process can prove an advantage for both parties. It gives hope that most crises are solvable on 
the basis of the rules and mechanisms established in a framework agenda, as these initial 
agreements give the whole subsequent negotiation stability by providing a common ground 
and a sense of predictability and common purpose.
VICTIM’S RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PARTICIPATION.
Victim’s rights and the question of how to deal with the legacy of the past have been neglected 
or poorly managed in many peace processes around the world, because of their complexity 
and sensitivity. Disputes over how to deal with the grievances of warring parties often prove 
to be a deal-breaker. Many negotiations have chosen to leave the issue of victim’s rights to 
future political debate, to avoid “contaminating” the process with “insoluble” issues that 
might derail it. is stems from a specious contradiction between justice and peace. Past trials 
at peace-making have given priority to reaching the peace agreement, regardless of justice, 
truth or reparations. Experience has exposed this approach as fundamentally awed, because 
postponing the demands of justice to future generations, and leaving unattended the seeds of 
potential conict, achieves only an unstable and short-lived peace. 
e Colombian peace process dees this approach. Both parties have agreed from the start 
that victims’ rights must be a distinct and central issue on the agenda. is acknowledgement 
responds to the sheer magnitude of human suering in the country: there are seven million 
victims of the various warring parties so far, 80% of whom are civilians. e government and 
FARC-EP recognised that an agreement that did not place victims’ rights at its core would be 
not only be unlawful, but also immoral, illegitimate and ephemeral. International law as it 
stands today provides for justice, truth and reparations to the victims of internationally 
recognised crimes. In acknowledgement of the value of the Colombian case, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is looking closely at it to understand how international criminal law 
Another key innovation of the Colombian peace process regarding international involvement 
is the participation role of international advisors. Both sides of the table have access to teams 
of international experts who can advise them on various matters, as provided by the 
framework agreement. is resource mechanism has been available in discussions on political 
participation and transitional justice, where international experience has proved invaluable. 
International input has played a positive role in bringing lessons and experiences learned 
from other peace processes around the world to bear on Colombia’s situation, and oering 
the parties a variety of solutions and ideas to the tactical and strategic dilemmas of the talks.
Another important feature of the peace process is the role played by the guarantor countries, 
Norway and Cuba, and by the observer countries, Chile and Venezuela. e guarantors’ role 
is to ensure that both parties abide by the agreed-upon rules, as trust can wane as negotiations 
wear on (Beittel 2013: 27). ere are also observers whose role is to clarify the disputed 
points in the case of a crisis that may lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations 
(Armengol 2013, 6). However, there is no appointed international mediator in the 
Colombian process (Gienger 2013). e role of these four countries has been key in settling 
disputes during negotiations; building trust between the parties; and solving the many 
day-to-day logistical issues.
Arranging a positive and supportive international context has been indispensable to the peace 
process because it helped shore up external legitimacy; gave much-needed access to lessons 
learnt in other countries; and served as an important indicator of progress for an 
often-incredulous public opinion at home. Negotiation of the topics in the framework 
agreement, especially those of illicit drugs and transitional justice, will have important 
international ramications. e international ambience set up before and kept in place during 
the process will certainly conduce to dealing with them in a constructive and positive way.  
PREPARATION, STRUCTURE AND DESIGN.
e Colombian peace talks are an example of preparing and designing a negotiation 
adequately to reach the desired endgame. During the exploratory talks, or what is commonly 
known in the literature as “talks about talks”, the parties agreed on three features that have 
proved crucial for the development of the public phase of the process. 
During conict, irregular armies, mainly FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas, waged war on the 
State and paramilitary forces throughout most of the country. e Colombian situation is 
one of the longest-running internal armed conicts in the world. As the following gures 
suggest, this devastating confrontation has been active for over ve decades and its magnitude 
was, and still is greater than many major inter-state wars in the world.
• As at the end of 2014, 38 million people around the world had been forced to ee their 
homes by armed conict. Colombia ranks second in the world according to the number of 
internally displaced people (IDP), with around 6 million IDPs, only surpassed by Syria with 
7.6 million. Iraq holds third place with 3.3 million. e IDP population of Colombia is 
equivalent to the whole population of Singapore or Denmark (IDMC, 2015).
• e Colombian government’s reparations programme set up in 2011 has so far registered 
7.7 million victims of displacement, murder, torture, sexual violence, disappearance and 
kidnapping, and other grave violations of human rights. is tally implies that almost 14% 
of the total population has suered directly from the conict and consider themselves victims 
(Colombia, Unidad de Victimas, 2015).
• Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of landmine victims; only Afghanistan and 
Cambodia have more victims of landmines (Colombia, PAICMA, 2015). 
• 220,000 killings have been registered during the conict, 80% of them civilians (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). is includes three Presidential candidates, one 
Attorney General, one Minister of Justice, 200 judges, 175 Mayors and sixteen Congressmen 
who were assassinated during the conict.
• Colombia has registered 100,000 victims of involuntary ‘disappearance’, a sum equal to all 
reported cases under the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile and Brazil combined (Colombia, 
Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013). 
• 3,000 militants of a single political party, the Unión Patriótica, were killed in a period of ten 
years during the internal war (Dudley, 2006).  
• e authorities have registered 39,058 kidnappings in the period between 1970 and 2010. 
is implies that, during that period, one person was abducted every 12 hours for political or 
economic ends (Colombia, Centro de Memoria Historica, Informe Secuestro 2013). 
• Governmental authorities and non-governmental organisations together have registered 
about 5,000 extrajudicial killings carried out by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.
An important feature of the Colombian peace process is that it has been exclusively led by the 
national government (Haspeslagh, 2015); while at the same time interactively engaging third 
parties and the international community as a whole. e role played by diplomacy partially 
explains why the peace eort is moving forward and achieving success; the international 
community as a whole and many leading states, which have become part of the process, have 
been a key to progress. 
From the beginning of his term in 2010, President Santos recognised that Colombia had to 
reboot its foreign policy and rebuild diplomatic ties with the world at large and with the 
Latin American region, especially its close neighbours Venezuela and Ecuador. e 
government of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) had escalated confrontations with other states in 
the region, accusing them of harbouring and supporting “terrorists”. At the global level, the 
international community had mistrusted the Colombian government because of its poor 
record on human rights, corruption, and for some, for its alignment with the Bush 
Administration during the rst years of the “war on terror”.  In early 2010 the international 
context was not appropriate to start negotiations to end one of the longest conicts of the 
Western Hemisphere, one heavily inuenced by the international drug trade, and one in 
which FARC-EP, the Colombian military forces, and various the paramilitaries were all 
involved in war international crimes. 
President Juan Manuel Santos and his Ministers knew that if a peace agreement were reached, 
the outcome would impact many foreign political agendas, such as US relations with Cuba 
and Venezuela, the limits of international criminal law, and the global debate over the war on 
drugs, among others. is is why Santos has been active and very successful in changing the 
negative trend inherited from the past. All nations in South America now fully support the 
Colombian peace process, and many countries around the world are ready to contribute to 
the implementation and verication of the nal agreements on matters ranging from 
investment in rural infrastructure, to reintegration of ex-combatants, to victims’ rights. 
Diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador were rebuilt and trust restored to the point 
that Venezuela could be accepted as a sponsor of the peace talks. Colombian diplomacy was 
strategic enough to enlist and appoint Cuba as the host country and guarantor of the process, 
alongside Norway, while keeping the US on board. So far, the USA, UNASUR, the European 
Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations have appointed special envoys to the 
process, which suggests a growing interest in the outcome and a commitment to addressing 
the challenges thereof. For example, when US Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Bernie 
Aronson the US Special Envoy, he stated: 
After a long year of negotiations on the topic of victims’ rights and transitional justice, the 
parties agreed three key elements of a broader transitional justice regime. In June 2015 they 
agreed the creation of a Truth Commission. On the 23rd of September 2015 the President of 
Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, and the FARC-EP’s Timochenko announced an agreement 
to create a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a mechanism to investigate, prosecute and punish 
international crimes. Finally, on the 18th of October 2015, the delegations announced an 
agreement to create a specialised unit (in addition to the CBM mentioned above) to search 
for people who disappeared as a result of the conict, which will start operations after the 
peace agreement, is signed.
Victims’ participation has been essential to the delegations’ work and to the peace process as 
a whole. e views expressed by victims are currently informing many agreements on the 
topic. Putting victims’ rights at the centre of the peace process has been one of the main 
contributions of the Colombian peace process.
CONCLUSION.
According to many experts, Colombia is currently the main peace process in the world and a 
cynosure of international peace-building. e Colombian case is proof that protracted 
internal armed conict can be addressed through dialogue (Herbolzheimer, 2014). I have 
discussed three main contributions that have emerging from the Colombian process: (i) a role 
for active diplomacy to enable a respectful international engagement, while at the same time 
conserving national ownership of the process; (ii) a robust strategic plan that observes the 
dierence between negotiating the end of the conict and building peace, between peace 
talks and the peace process; (iii) the commitment to victims’ rights, which has led to a 
national and global debate over the possibilities and limits of applying international criminal 
law in the context of peace negotiations, and the meaning of reconciliation. Colombia is a 
timely reference for a global community standing at the crossroads of ways to address 
complex violence in the age of accountability. 
e treatment given to diplomacy, the importance of contextual preparation and design, and 
the inclusion of victims’ rights as a central issue all evidence that Colombia’s peace process is 
setting new standards in many elds and is becoming an exemplar for peace endeavours 
around the world. Colombia is developing a new model that other countries, especially in the 
Global South, can adopt to satisfy the increasing global demands for accountability, while 
also helping those in conict to achieve a stable and lasting peace.
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might be harmonised with the right of states to pursue peace for their peoples and future 
generations. Currently, both parties are aiming for a peace deal that looks to the future but 
also recognises and acknowledges what happened in the past. ere is a common 
understanding that in order to initiate the peace-building phase, not only the parties to the 
conict but also the whole population must face the past in a constructive, reective and 
comprehensive way. 
To carry out the principle of prioritising victim’s rights, the parties have created three 
mechanisms to empower victims to take their rightful place in the talks. e Colombian 
peace process is a world-class example of how victims can participate directly in peace talks. 
In past peace processes around the world, victims and their organisations only had a chance 
to be involved after an agreement was reached, either participating in truth commissions or 
in trials against perpetrators. In the Colombian process, victims have been actively 
participating from the outset. 
e rst mechanism created was a direct channel, via electronic or conventional mail, for 
sending proposals to both delegations, so that victims could directly contribute to the drafting 
of the agreements. To date, the government and FARC-EP have received 24,475 proposals 
regarding victims’ rights issues (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e second mechanism was participation in several events in Colombia expressly created for 
victims to impact the negotiations in Cuba. e delegations appointed a collegiate third 
party, composed of the United Nations, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and the 
Catholic Church, to organise regional events where victims from all over the country could 
deliver their views, expectations and proposals. ese events where attended by 3,162 victims 
and 4,617 victims’ organisations, from whom the parties received an additional 22,146 
proposals (Colombia, Oce of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
e third mechanism consisted of public hearings in Havana, where victims were invited to 
engage directly with both delegations. e sessions took place before and during the 
discussion of victims’ rights and transitional justice with the aim of hearing victims in person 
tell of their expectations and demands, in hopes that this would enlighten the talks while they 
were still on going. In ve hearings, sixty victims from dierent regions, who had suered 
diverse violations of their rights at the hands of many armed actors, were able to confront the 
delegations and by their narratives convey their suering, expectations and needs. is 
unprecedented mechanism was pivotal for starting the dicult negotiations about how to 
deal with the past in Colombia.
1. e author prepared this policy brief in his personal capacity. e opinions expressed in this paper are the author's own and 
do not reect the view of any institution or Government.
